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1980 military coup d’état was a rupture in Turkish political system and society, in range 
and consequences comparable at least with the transition to parliamentary democracy in 
1946. The causes of the coup were manifold: a malfunctioning parliamentary democracy 
and weak governments were not able to deal with political terrorism and severe economic 
crisis. Meanwhile, a switch in the Cold War balance of powers upped the strategic 
importance of Turkey for NATO and the US, which became impatient for stability in 
Turkey. A further cause of the coup was a peculiar political role of the military in Turkey. 
This thesis explores the nature and worldview of the Turkish military, from the Republican 
beginnings until 1980. The military’s ideological doctrine, Kemalism, is a variant of 
corporatist ideology, a political ideology opposed to both modern western liberalism and 
socialism/communism. An ideal society for the military is an orderly, harmonious society, 
with interests of the nation above individual interests. Although Kemalism demanded that 
Turkey adopts western institutions, common points with liberalism are fairly sporadic and 
accidental, and democratic ideal is subordinate to corporatist goals. This explains the 
paradox why the military has claimed, on one hand, that they are protectors of democracy, 
while on the other hand they have intervened and suspended democracy three times. The 
1980 intervention manifested the military’s doctrine in an exemplary fashion: they limited 
the scope of freedom for education institutions and press, and increased the influence of 
military bodies over civilian sphere. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
ORDUNUN TÜRK SĐYASETĐNDEKĐ ROLÜ: 
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1980 askeri darbesi, etkileri ve sonuçları bakımından Türk siyaset sistemi ve toplumunda 
1946’da parlamenter sisteme geçiste yaşanılana benzer bir kırılma noktası teşkil etti. 
Darbenin nedenleri muhtelifti: aksak işleyen parlamenter demokrasi ve zayıf hükümetler 
siyasi terörizm ve ciddi ekonomik krizle başa çıkamadı. Soğuk Savaş döneminde kuvvetler 
dengesinde yaşanan değişim sonrasında NATO ve Amerika kendileri icin stratejik önemi 
artan Türkiye’nin bir an önce istikrara kavuşması konusunda sabırsızdılar. Darbenin bir 
nedeni de Türkiye’de ordunun siyasetteki özel rolü idi. Bu tez, Cumhuriyet’in başından 
1980’lere kadar Türk ordusunun niteliğini ve dünya görüşünü incelemektedir. Ordunun 
ideolojik doktrini olan Kemalizm, korporatist ideolojinin bir başka biçimde tezahür etmiş 
biçimidir. Hem modern Batı liberalizmine hem de sosyalizm/komunizme karşı bir 
ideolojidir. Ordu için ideal toplum, itaatli, uyumlu, milli çıkarlarını kişisel çıkarların 
üstünde tutan bir toplumdur. Kemalizmin Türkiye’nin batı kurumlarını örnek alma ilkesine 
rağmen liberalizmin uygulanışı düzensiz ve tesadüfidir. Demokratik idealler ise korporatist 
hedeflerin yanında ikincil konumdadır. Bu da demokratisin koruyucusu olduğunu iddia 
eden ordunun demokrasiye üç defa müdahale edip onu kesintiye uğratmasındaki çelişkiyi 
açıklar. 1980 darbesi ordunun doktrinini açıkça göstermiştir: Ordu, eğitim kurumlarının ve 
basının özgürlük alanlarını daraltıp, askeri birimlerin sivil alandaki etkisini arttırmıştır. 
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ITRODUCTIO 
 
 
 
 
After more then 30 years, the 1980 military coup still flames controversies and discussions 
in the public and media in Turkey. Not without reason: Turkey today, its society and basic 
institutions such as the constitution or the laws regarding democratic procedures, is largely 
a creation of the 1980-83 military regime. After 1980 we talk about the Third Turkish 
Republic, and the associated so-called new Ataturkisation of Turkish society. It is a society 
fundamentally different from pre 1980-Turkey: a society in which basic institutions such as 
education, media and political system were restructured in accordance with the 
isolat0ionist, nationalist, secularist, in one word, Ataturkist principles, principles that had 
become looser in the three decades preceding 1980. In this sense, the 1980 coup represents 
a rupture in the republican history of Turkey, in range and consequences comparable at 
least with the transition from one-party rule to democracy that took place in 1946. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore historically and in a more general sense the role of the 
military in Turkish politics (particularly after democracy was introduced): we try to dwell 
into the structure and world outlook of the military in order to explain what were the inner 
motives of the military that made it leave its principle domain – security – and engage in 
politics, and break up and suspend democracy three times. Therein, the focus is on the 1980 
coup because of our initial assumption that the 1980 coup demonstrated better than any 
other intervention preceding it the power and socio-political influence that the military 
holds over society and politics in Turkey. This assumption is based on the fact that, firstly, 
the 1980 military regime lasted longer than those of 1960 and 1971, and implemented a 
larger number of fundamental reforms regarding politics and economy. Secondly, the 
military ruled almost entirely on its own, with no assistance or a working coalition with any 
of the existing political parties (unlike the previous two interventions); thus, it is in this 
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coup that the worldview and political outlook of the military can be observed at its purest. 
And thirdly, it was the last direct military coup that Turkey has had, with effects that are 
easily discernable until the early 2000s, and to a significant extent still today. Our analysis 
extends from the last few years prior to the intervention, focusing on the developments in 
politics, economy, civil society and the military, then deals with the years of the military 
regime in which social and economic reforms were implemented, and ends with the return 
to civilian regime that took place in November 1983.  
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PART I 
THE TURBULET 1970s: SETTIG GROUD FOR A MILITARY COUP 
 
 
 
 
   “It’s all very well to talk about not taking sides and being above everything! Is that 
possible in this country? We’re forced to make choices. To choose between political 
parties we don’t believe in… Which one can we choose? /…/ Should one go down to 
the level of the people and struggle side by side with them? Should one be a milk-and-
water Social Democrat or a full-blown revolutionary? Or should one join a cell in 
the underground movement or what? Just let me do what I’m best at. I’d like to be 
helpful in an advisory capacity… But no, that’s not allowed. By either side…” 
 
Adalet Ağaoğlu, Curfew 
 
The First Part aims to analyze the political and social developments before the actual coup, 
inside Turkey and internationally, trying to focus on the factors that brought Turkish 
economy and society into such conditions in which a military takeover became possible 
and, according to some, even desirable and legitimate as a means to end the social turmoil 
and bring economy back to order. It is divided into six chapters. The first chapter analyzes 
developments on the political scene; the second focuses more on political happenings 
within the civil society, with emphasis on the issue of political terrorism; the third chapter 
explains what governmental policies and external influences led to the economic crisis; the 
following chapter talks about the position of Turkey in international relations; the fifth 
chapter is more extensive and represents a slight digression, analyzing the hierarchical 
structure of the Turkish military, the evolution of its ideological doctrine, and its role in 
politics before 1980; the six chapter rounds up the events leading to the 12 September coup 
and summarizes the immediate perception of the takeover among the public and in the 
media. 
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Overall, the First part tries to show how different spheres of society influenced one another, 
as the society as a whole was becoming more and more dysfunctional: polarization and 
militarization of the civil society affected political parties to become more radicalized and 
less receptive for political compromise; parliamentary deadlocks and inability of the 
executive to effectively govern the state, then, further radicalized civil society. In the 
meanwhile, the military entered a state of alarm regarding stability and territorial integrity 
of the country: their efforts to stabilize the political situation varied from putting pressure 
on the politicians through the national Security Council, to plotting a military takeover. 
 
 
 
1. Turkish Politics of the Late 1970s: Crisis of Democratic System 
 
 
 
The period starting from October 1973 elections and lasting till the 1980 takeover can be 
read as probably the most unstable and turbulent period of Turkish post-World War II 
history: these were years filled with fragile and ineffective governments, escalating popular 
unrest, political terrorism and steeply deteriorating economic conditions. For example, 
throughout the 1950s – the first decade of Turkish democratic politics if we neglect the 
1946 elections – there was one single prime minister – Adnan Menderes. On the other 
hand, in the seven years between October 1973 and September 1980 there were four 
different governments with two different prime ministers, several caretaker governments 
that would last up to seven months, and a number of inconclusive elections, both 
parliamentary and presidential. Mehmet Ali Birand in his book on the 1980 coup compares 
Turkish political and social history of the 1970s with a marry-go-round that “spin out of 
control, as if some dues ex machina tempered with its gears and breaks and sped up events 
and developments”.1 Indeed, the succession of the events and political decisions that led 
towards the coup, especially in the last couple of years of the decade – approximately when 
the RPP government took over in 1978 – virtually read as an unstoppable, deterministic, 
                                                 
1 Mehmet Ali Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 
1980 (London [etc.]: Brassey's, 1987), pp. 14-15. 
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almost teleological historical development with no possibility of being slowed down or 
reversed and no other chance than to end with a military coup. 
 
Usually, the period between 1971 and 1980 is regarded as a whole, i.e. a specific and 
complete chapter in Turkish political history. Yet for the purpose of this thesis we will limit 
our analysis to the last few years before the actual takeover, that is, from the 1977 general 
elections to September 1980. It is possible to trace trends and developments that are 
directly linked to the 1980 takeover during the rule of the government formed in the 
aftermath of the 1977 elections, while there are less direct links before that date. 
 
Following the military takeover of 12 March 1971, there was no military regime, strictly 
speaking; however, the regime was not a free parliamentary democracy either. For more 
then two years, Turkey was governed by cabinets that worked closely with the National 
Security Council (a body that had been designed to bring together military’s top ranking 
personnel and politicians to discuss current political and security issues). Democracy was 
restored in the autumn of 1973 when general elections were held. However, they turned out 
inconclusive. New government was formed in February 1974, a coalition between the 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; abbrev. RPP) and National Salvation 
Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi; NSP), with the head of RPP Bülent Ecevit as the prime 
minister. It was a short-lived government (February-September 1974), yet remembered for 
the military operation in Cyprus in July 1974. 
 
The RPP-NSP coalition was a fragile one, mainly because the two parties had very 
different ideologies, especially on the issue of secularity (RPP being an old Kemalist-
secularist party, and NSP an Islamic party). They were largely united by opposition to the 
Süleyman Demirel’s center-right Justice Party (Adalet Partisi; JP).2 Following the RPP-
NSP coalition, Turkey saw three different successive coalitions until 1980. The 
“Nationalist Front” coalition, consisted of JP, Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi; NAP) and NSP and under the premiership of Süleyman Demirel lasted from March 
1975 to June 1977. The elections of June 1977 were inconclusive. In the following year in 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p. 18. 
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January, Bülent Ecevit formed an RPP government with 12 JP defectors. Ecevit’s 
government was losing support steadily, until JP won the by-elections in October 1979. JP 
government, formed in November 1979, lasted until the 12 September military coup. 
 
To start from the Nationalist Front coalition – this was essentially a government against all 
forms of leftism. The NAP coalition partner was a party based on the ideology of ethnic 
Turkish nationalism, closely associated with neo-fascism and profoundly anticommunist. 
The NAP party leader and the government’s deputy prime minister, ex-colonel Alparslan 
Türkeş was put in charge of internal matters and the secret services. Hence from 1975 
onwards there was a drastic increase of partisanship in the civil bureaucracy. The so-called 
“Grey Wolves” or “commandos”, youth and paramilitary organization of the NAP, largely 
infiltrated governmental security positions, which led to an escalation in political violence 
in the streets as they started fighting out with the left.3 
 
NSP, on the other hand, was against the left on the issue of secularism versus religion. The 
party took over the key economic and public sector ministries and, similarly to the NAP, 
started appointing partisan people to important posts. In a way, the JP, that was in fact not 
so distant from RPP ideologically speaking, was being radicalized by the two smaller 
parties on the extreme right. Same was happening with the RPP at the time. Although it is 
true that the RPP had taken a left-of-center turn under Ecevit during the 1960s and defined 
itself as a social-democrat party, with considerable socialist leanings, it was still a center-
left party.4 However, it kept being dragged from the center by far-left political fractions and 
organizations and the according electoral base. These trends made it very difficult for the 
JP and the RPP, the two biggest parties and their leaders to cooperate, or at time even to 
communicate with each other.5 
 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 19. 
4 The turn to the left also made RPP more alienated from the military, while the party 
that enjoyed the biggest confidence of the army was a relatively small party, the 
Republican Reliance Party, which had split from the RPP amidst the RPP’s left turn. 
(Cf. ibid.) 
5 Ibid. 
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In the two years and three months of the Nationalist Front government, large section of the 
public (including the military) observed with discontent the concessions made to Islamic 
fundamentalism and the rise of partisan politics. Economic disorders mounted. As 
economist Çağlar Keyder commented, the ruling coalition was “not a compromised-yet 
organic unity; it rather worked on the basis of a parcellization of the state apparatus”.6 
 
In the elections on 5 June 1977 the RPP again won the plurality of seats in parliament, but 
it fell thirteen seats short from majority so it was not able to form a government of its own. 
Finally, after several months of party talks and negotiations, the RPP formed a government 
with twelve defectors from JP, two from the Republican Reliance Party and one from the 
Democratic Party. It took office in January 1978.  
 
The new government was expected with great hopes. But it would turn out to be a 
disappointment. It was not capable of dealing with the economic trouble that it partly 
inherited from the previous government (in press, the period of 1975-77 was often referred 
as the “period of collapse”).7 It could not tackle street terror. The opposition, most notably 
Demirel and JP, was undermining the legitimacy of the government throughout its entire 
mandate. Demirel, for instance, deliberately kept avoiding referring to Ecevit as “prime 
minister”, using the term “head of the government” instead.8 The constant harping on the 
rules of the game ultimately served the anti-parliamentary movements of the extreme right 
and left.9 Further, the RPP itself became an arena of hostile factions, each with its own 
baron, fighting for supremacy, rather than a coherent organizational entity.10 Ecevit himself 
                                                 
6 Çağlar Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy” <ew Left Review, 
No. 115 (May-June 1979), p. 6 and p. 12; via Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 
19. 
7 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 36. 
8 Ibid., p. 33. Another example from Demirel’s speeches; he is addressing Ecevit: “You 
may have intrigued your way to finding a majority in the parliament, but you will never 
represent the majority. You may have declared yourselves a government, but you will 
never be able to govern.” (ibid.) 
9 Ibid., p. 34. 
10 Ibid., p. 88. 
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was becoming more and more isolated both in relation to foreign allies (the USA saw him 
as an obstacle in their policies concerning the Middle East) and in his own country (e.g. he 
did not have support from the military which almost hated him). He was only supported by 
a minority fraction in his own party. All in all, it appears that the RPP, having been in 
opposition for so long (for 23 years out of 28 years since 1950), had lost their skills to 
administer a state with a massive bureaucracy and numerous levels of power.11 They were 
losing public support steadily. 
 
On 14 October 1979 by-elections for five seats in the National Assembly and one-third of 
the Senate were held. They were also a kind of referendum, a “vote of confidence” on the 
future of the Ecevit government. JP won all five seats in the lower chamber and thirty 
senate seats out of fifty in the senate. Ecevit resigned and a JP minority government took 
over in November, with indirect support of other rightist parties. 
 
Demirel’s minority government – also the first minority government in Turkey’s republican 
history – was yet another weak government that did not promise much in terms of tackling 
with the country’s crisis. Ecevit tried to persuade Demirel into forming a grand coalition of 
RPP and JP.  This was the first time when the idea of a great coalition was put forth. 
However, Demirel, distrusting Ecevit and suspecting a trap, rejected the idea.12 Thereafter 
the two of them met a few more times with mediation of the president, trying to sort out 
their disagreements and find a cooperative way to confront the pregnant economic 
problems, and even more the political terrorism, but never with success. 
 
On top of all, presidential crisis emerged on 6 April 1980, when president Fahri Korutürk’s 
term was over. The two biggest parties could not agree on the new candidate and there was 
fruitless voting in the parliament (over 100 rounds). Finally, Đhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, 
speaker of the senate and Demirel’s former foreign minister, became the caretaker of the 
president. For years before, the election of president had been hinged upon agreements 
between the two major parties to provide a parliamentary majority for a candidate 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 90. 
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acceptable to both – that is why the quarrel over a new president was a final signal that the 
country was in a deep institutional and democratic crisis.13 
 
 
 
2. Street Violence 
 
 
 
Before the RPP government took office in 1978, street terror was only limited to cities. 
Within the first six months of the new government, however, it expanded into Anatolian 
towns. One of the first shocking events, a forecast of what was yet to come, happened on 
17 April 1978 in the Anatolian city of Malatya. Hamid Fendoğlu, mayor of Malatya and a 
JP member, was blown up along with his daughter-in-law and two grandchildren. There 
were certain hints as to who was responsible, for instance, the bomb was produced in the 
Turkish Nuclear Energy Center near Istanbul, at the time under control of the Grey Wolves. 
This assassination triggered off violence in the province, especially in Eastern Turkey.14 
 
The violence was not only politically motivated (clashes between the far-left and far-right) 
but also involved ethnic conflicts, for example the conflict along Alevi-Sunni lines. 
Different lines of division were often intersected: the political right would support the 
Sunni majority, while the left would support an oppressed Alevi minority. Furthermore, the 
rapid eruption of bloodshed and brutality could not have been only a consequence of the 
dismal social and economic crisis of the last half of decade – these were ethnic tensions that 
had been accumulated over the decades, probably even centuries.15 
 
Statistics of 1978 are lurid. In sectarian rioting in Sivas on 3 September, over 1000 homes 
were destroyed, 9 people died, and 92 were injured. Later during that month, there were 12 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 132. 
14 Ibid., p. 37. 
15 Especially notable is the geographical triangle with its apex in Kahramanmaraş and 
the base towards the Black Sea coast: an area characterized by Kurdish-Turkish and 
Alevi-Sunni divisions. (Cf. ibid., p. 60.) 
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dead in two days of violence in Elâzığ, Gaziantep and Adana, and 15 people were reported 
killed in Van. On 3 October the NAP Istanbul regional chief Recep Hasatlı and his son 
were slain by automatic fire. The following day, two left-wing youngsters were forced out 
of an Istanbul bus and executed by a firing squad in view of horrified passengers.16 
 
In the cities, initially, political activism of youths was mainly limited to university 
campuses areas. Different university campuses became “fortresses”, kind of para-military 
strongholds of extreme left- or right-wing political organizations.17 In time, it became 
common for the militant students to regularly interrupt classes, threaten those faculty 
members who they perceived to be hostile to their view, and used dormitories as safe 
houses and place of recruitment of new members into their groups.18 Eventually, this 
activism became more radicalized and started involving arms; it also spread to the urban 
areas. The situation in some cities started to resemble 1920s Chicago with its gang-warfare, 
as whole sections of cities were parceled out between the various left- and right-wing para-
militaries, who then proclaimed their parts of the city – mostly gecekondu or shanty-town 
areas – as “liberated zones”.19 
 
On one end of political spectrum, there was the far left or “orthodox left”, ideologically 
influenced by diverse Marxist-Leninist currents, such as Guevarism or the legacy of May 
1968. They took different socialist models as a source of inspiration: some were pro-Soviet, 
while others looked towards Mao’s China, Cuba, or even Enver Hoxha’s Albania.20 Hence 
the left was very fragmented and the fractions became extremely numerous by late 1970s: 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 38. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Sabri Sayarı, “Political violence and terrorism in Turkey, 1976-80: a retrospective 
analysis” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, Issue 2 (2010), p. 200.  
19 Ibid., p. 210. Even entire towns in the province were proclaimed as independent 
zones under control of this or that political organization: Çorum in Northern Turkey 
was claimed as a “no-go” area by the right, while the far-left proclaimed Fatsa on the 
Black sea as its own territory, before being crushed by a detachment of tanks and 
troops. (Cf. Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 147.) 
20 Sayarı, “Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-1980: A Retrospective 
Analysis”, p. 202. 
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one left-wing daily newspaper counted 49 different left-wing party manifestos in 1979, 
including programs of secessionist Kurdish organizations.21 Many of these fractions turned 
to militant tactics and established urban guerillas – to a great extent this was a response to 
the aggressive militantism of the ultra-right para-military sects, such as the infamous Grey 
Wolves, a wing of the NAP. However, especially within the left, there was also a lot of 
intra-group violence between different factions as they fought for the leadership of the 
leftist militancy.22 
 
On the other end, there was the extreme right which was initially tolerated by the 
conservative establishment as a countervailing force to the left-wing student movement (cf. 
the Nationalist Front coalition mentioned above). Soon, they became the strongest mass 
right-wing movement in Europe (the NAP had a 6.4% share of votes in 1977, hence 
commanded almost two million votes).23 
 
On 13 October 1978 Ecevit made an unfortunate statement: “We have reached the end of 
the bloody scenarios. The security forces have managed to infiltrate and disperse most of 
the left-wing terrorist cells. We now have conclusive proof of the sources of right-wing 
terror.”24 The reality was exactly the opposite – things were getting worse. A significant 
turning point in augmentation of street terror was the massacre in Kahramanmaraş that took 
place between the 19 and 25 December 1978. The event started off with a bomb explosion 
in a cinema. The following day gangs of rightists machine gunned and bombed a coffee 
house frequented by left-wingers. Two days later two teachers were murdered and one had 
his house bombed. Next day these sporadic events escalated into full scale assault; by 24 
December there were 100 deaths and hundreds of casualties and the events began to spread 
to neighboring provinces. What was particularly horrifying about this violence was that 
                                                 
21 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 50. 
22 Sayarı, “Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-1980: A Retrospective 
Analysis”, p. 205. 
23 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 50. 
24 Ibid., p. 38. 
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even three-year-old children were butchered and pregnant women’s abdomens were stuck 
by bayonets.25 
 
Following the Kahramanmaraş event, martial law was declared in 13 provinces of Turkey 
(out of then total 67) and military tribunals were set up. Another immediate effect of the 
massacre was that the West turned its attention to violence in Turkey (especially Germany 
and the US). They realized that Turkey was not only facing serious economic difficulties 
but was also in danger of disintegration.26 
 
Another milestone in terms of whom the violence was directed to occurred on 1 February 
1979 when Abdi Đpekçi, liberal editor of newspaper Milliyet, was killed in his car in 
Istanbul.27 Terror was no longer restricted to the fighting militants but turned on moderates, 
university professors, lecturers and public personalities. Many were compelled to hire 
bodyguards or sleep at a different place each night. Some people migrated to other towns to 
protect their anonymity, while judges and prosecutors began arming themselves.28 
 
By mid-1979, an average of 20 Turks lost their lives in political violence each day. There 
was not a single day without a murder.29 In the five years from 1976 to 1980, more than 
5,000 people lost their lives in hundreds of terrorist incidents. This was a bloody statistics 
even in comparison with other European countries that were known for the problem of 
political terrorism at the time: during the early months of 1980, terrorism in Turkey caused 
more fatalities in one week than it did in Italy in entire year or in West Germany during the 
entire decade.30 A large part of the population was directly involved in armed clashes. Even 
                                                 
25 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
26 Ibid. 
27 He was assassinated by Mehmet Ali Ağca, ultranationalist terrorist who later made a 
well-known attempt to kill Pope John Paul II in Rome in 1981. (Cf. Sayarı, “Political 
Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-1980: A Retrospective Analysis”, p. 204.) 
28 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 60. 
29 Ibid., p. 48. 
30 Sayarı, “Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-1980: A Retrospective 
Analysis”, p. 198. 
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by very conservative estimates, there were more than 10,000 young men and women 
among the ranks of leftist, rightist or Kurdish separatist organizations.31  
 
Finally, we should note that while casualties were a consequence of various types of 
conflicts (ethnic, religious etc.) statistically probably the most frequent and pervasive 
divisive line was the antagonism between leftist and rightist groups, one that also accounted 
for the greatest number of terrorist incidents. These clashes were particularly hard to detain 
due to an almost standard, predictable pattern that they followed: a leftist terrorist was 
murdered and immediately proclaimed a martyr by his comrades and given a political 
funeral. It then triggered the revenge killing of a right-wing terrorist. In turn, the rightists 
proclaimed their victim as a martyr and took out a leftist militant. There was a similar 
course followed with respect to public figures: an assassination of a journalist working for a 
right-wing journal would result in an assassination of a professor suspected of having 
sympathy with leftism.32 Violence eventually became self-perpetrating: 
 
   “[L]eftist and rightist terrorism literally fed off each other. The dialectical process 
of mutual escalation was the most distinctive characteristic of the ‘anarchy’ in 
Turkey. It also proved to be difficult to contain since the number of ‘martyrs’ on each 
side grew at an accelerated pace, thereby perpetuating the vicious cycles of 
violence.”33 
 
Meanwhile, even in the capital, Ankara, few people would dare to walk in the streets at 
night.34 As the streets were filled with bloodshed, common people or “bystanders” were 
getting anxious to return to usual life and hoped that the government, or for that matter any 
force strong enough would detain violence and resume peace. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 202. 
32 Sayarı, “Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-1980: A Retrospective 
Analysis”, p. 203-204. 
33 Ibid., p. 204. 
34 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 38. 
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3. Economic Crisis 
 
 
 
Turkey was facing a severe economic crisis in the last few years of the 1970s. The winter 
of 1978-79, for instance, came to be known as the “winter of discontent”: during one of the 
coldest winters in Anatolia in many years there was no heating in cities because of a lack of 
fuel oil for central heating systems, as oil imports to turkey had stopped. Even the 
parliament itself was without heating. It was hard to get through with life for an average 
Turk, as there was lack of many basic commodities such as light bulbs, vital medicines and 
toilet paper. Inflation was rampant, and workers’ strikes and other work stoppages were 
overwhelming the economic life of the country.35 It was this economic crisis, probably 
even more than the social unrest and street violence, which led to such instability of 
political life of the late 1970s.36 
 
The causes for the crisis are manifold and they can be traced up to two decades before the 
actual crisis. In fact, it is necessary to view the crisis in the context of the economic policies 
that had been carried out in Turkey from 1960, after the first military takeover, to 1980. 
Over these twenty years, Turkey had an economic system of import-substituting 
industrialization. This was a period of rapid industrialization in Turkey, like in many other 
Third-world countries at the time, and successive governments in Turkey tried to create as 
self-sufficient market as possible, so they stimulated a home-grown industry. They did it in 
three main ways. First, through extensive import restrictions and high tariffs designed to 
keep out European and American industrial products. On the other hand, Turkey was 
importing oil and huge amounts of partial, intermediate goods, which would then be used 
by domestic firms to produce final products for domestic market (that is where the name 
“import-substitution” derives from). Thus, Turkey was by and large dependent on its own 
production of industrial goods. Second, through manipulation of the exchange rate, that is, 
keeping the rate of the Turkish lira artificially high, so that the Turkish firms that were 
                                                 
35 Anne Krueger and Okan H. Aktan, Swimming against the Tide (San Francisco: ICS 
Press, 1992), p. 34. 
36 Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 267. 
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allowed to purchase dollars or Deutschmarks from the government were able to buy foreign 
materials cheaply. Third, by creating a buoyant internal market. This was done by paying 
high guarantee prices to farmers (far above the world price) and by allowing industrial 
workers high wage rises.37 
 
Import-substituting industrialization normally took the form of a joint venture in the sense 
that a foreign company supplied technological know-how and the components and raw 
materials. The Turkish partner supplied the capital, the workforce and the distribution 
system, as well as influential contacts. As a consequence of the inward orientation and 
import restrictions there was no real competition between the foreign firms and their 
Turkish partners. But what is more, there was very little competition between Turkish 
producers too. Oligopolies were established in almost every sector. There would be two or 
three rival holding companies each founding one car factory, one soft-drink distribution 
network etc. and dividing the market between themselves (under this arrangement, 
industries that would not be able to compete on an open world market had good profits at 
home).38 
 
The influence of politics in economy was strong and it was exerted mainly through the 
State Planning Office (or: State Planning Organization), established in 1960. The State 
Planning Office, together with foreign consultants, started to formulate five-year 
development plans. At first, these were applied to all economic sectors. However, after the 
first five-year plan, they were declared binding only for the state sector (comprised of so-
called “state-economic enterprises” or “state-owned enterprises”; abbrev. SEEs), but only 
indicative for the private sector which rested more on market mechanisms.39 
 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 265. 
38 Ibid., p. 266. 
39 This was largely due to the change of government from a more statist Republican 
People’s Party to Justice Party which saw the state more as subservient to private 
enterprise. (Cf. ibid.) 
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For some time, this system was quite successful in terms of economic growth. Between 
1963 and 1976 the annual rate of growth was 6.9% on average.40 It could be claimed that 
after World War II Turkey was the poorest European country and the richest Asian one (if 
we ignore the Soviet Union and East Asian countries). On the other hand, per capita 
income rate did not grow equally rapidly (under 3% annually from 1950 to 1980). This was 
mainly because of a great population growth (over 2.5% annually in the same period).41 
 
One problem of this development policy was that the industrial sector was not very 
efficient – a sector that was largely consisted of the state-economic enterprises and made 
about 40% of the total industrial production.42 Business decisions in this sector were 
politically influenced (including the pricing of products) and the SEEs were hugely 
overstaffed. This resulted in heavy losses (e.g. nine billion Turkish liras in 1977 alone). 
While half to two-thirds of fixed capital investments were in this sector, its share in total 
value added declined from half to one-third in the 1960s and 1970s.43 
 
That was not the main weakness of the system though – there were other more important 
causes that led to the crisis of the later 1970s. One “Achilles heel” of this development 
strategy was that the new industries were heavily dependent on imports of foreign parts and 
materials for production, and thus on availability of foreign reserves (i.e. foreign currency 
deposits held by monetary authorities) to pay for them. The access to these funds – they 
were mostly government-held –, rather than industrial or commercial qualities of a firm, 
often determined whether a firm could survive.44 Since Turkey had a persistent balance of 
trade and balance of payments deficit throughout these two decades it was a major problem 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Krueger and Aktan, Swimming against the Tide, p. 5. 
42 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 266. 
43 Ibid. 
44 There were also widespread opportunities for rent-seeking and unproductive forms of 
investment as economic agents tried to take advantage of the variety of controls and 
regulations imposed on the price mechanism. Cf. Ziya Öniş: State and Market: The 
Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective (Istanbul: Bogazici 
University Press, 1999), p. 462. 
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to make available the necessary dollars and Deutschmarks. The need was partly met by 
American aid and by transfers from Turkish workers who had moved to Europe. 
 
However, the oil crisis in 1973-74 led to a fourfold increase of the price of oil on the 
international market.45 On one hand, the drastic increases of oil prices directly shocked 
Turkish economy that was dependent on foreign inputs of raw materials, especially oil as a 
source of energy. The increase in oil prices meant a rising import bill which had to be paid 
in dollars. For instance, after the second oil shock (1979-80), two thirds of Turkey’s foreign 
currency reserves went to meeting the oil bill. On the other hand, the oil crisis brought 
recession in Europe, so the transfers of the Turkish workers in Germany began to decline 
steeply after 1974: partly because their own economic situation in Germany worsened, and 
partly because they lost confidence in the situation in Turkey, so they kept their money in 
Germany (the money that had been used to compensate for the foreign currency deficit).46 
At that point, the government failed to take significant action, permitting the current 
account to worsen rapidly. Also, the government’s fiscal deficit rose sharply towards 1980, 
since most of the petroleum imports were on government account and the government 
failed significantly to increase domestic oil prices.47 
 
The Nationalist Front coalition government (1975-77) tried to solve the problem by 
concluding extremely costly short-term Euro-dollar loans and by printing money. 
Meanwhile, oil for industry and for generating electricity was becoming increasingly scarce 
(for example, by 1979, power cuts up to five hours per day were the rule, even in winter). 
Rising price of energy, together with printing of money, resulted in inflation. During the 
first years of the 1970s, inflation was running at around 20% a year – in 1979 it was 90% 
and rising.48 Simultaneously, growth slowed down significantly. In 1979, the real GNP was 
growing only at half rate of the preceding three years and the five-year interval ending in 
                                                 
45 The crisis was caused by the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the USA and some other 
OPEC members because of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
46 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 267. 
47 Krueger and Aktan, Swimming against the Tide, p. 18. 
48 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 267. 
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1980 recorded the slowest rate of economic growth of any such period since 1950 (growth 
averaged a little over 6% annually between 1950 and 1975, compared to only 2.7% in 
1980). As a result, Turkish living standards did not increase much between 1975 and 1978: 
real per capita incomes are estimated to have dropped by 5.8% from 1978 to 1980. 49 
 
By 1978 it was clear that radical measures needed to be taken to normalize the economic 
situation in the country. When Turkey’s transition from import-substituting 
industrialization to neoliberal economy is being discussed, usually what is mentioned is the 
24 January 1980 reform package initiated under the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel. 
However, already before that, under Bülent Ecevit’s government, there were two liberal 
reform packages negotiated toward more liberal economy, although they were not 
implemented. Namely, the Ecevit’s government started negotiations about new credits with 
the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD in 1978.50 The government seems to have made an 
assessment that the main problem was the unavailability of foreign exchange: shortage of 
dollars was restricting imports, which were then constraining domestic production levels. 
Their solution was therefore to seek for foreign aid and foreign loans.51 
 
In this context it is helpful to learn the general policy of the IMF, the main foreign 
institution that Turkish government negotiated with for loans. At the time, IMF was 
launching what it saw as a “new economic order”, a Friedmanite model of a free market. 
This model would become effective throughout the 1980s, especially among Latin 
American debtors and in the Third World in general: breaking import substitution, 
domestic markets, strong public sector, and replacing it with free market and private sector. 
Countries in a similar situation as Turkey had to either accept the terms of IMF terms or 
face recession.52 
 
                                                 
49 Krueger and Aktan, Swimming against the Tide, pp. 18-19. 
50 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 268. 
51 Krueger and Aktan, Swimming against the Tide, p. 36. 
52 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 121. 
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The first standby agreement with the IMF was reached in 1978 but it was evident by 
September of the same year that it would fail (Turkish government wrote to the IMF, 
noting that the IMF conditions had not been met). Negotiations for the second standby 
agreement started the following year and were concluded in July 1979. This agreement was 
basically a reform package which was consisted of goals to abolish import and export 
controls, cutting subsidies and government expenditures, freeing interest rates – in one 
word, liberalizing the economy.53 The main reason why the negotiations between the IMF 
and Ecevit’s government were so slow and delayed was that free market policies were 
anathema to RPP as a social-democrat party: 
 
   “The political views and ideological complexion of the left-of-center Ecevit 
government created almost insurmountable barriers in … taking decisive action to 
counter it. The Ecevit government appeared convinced of the paramount virtues of 
government intervention in the economy. … In addition, it was emotionally inclined 
towards a self-sufficient, even autarkic view of economic development, which 
restricted to a minimum the foreign role in the economy. The RPP had, in recent 
years, espoused undefined causes and slogans, such as total independence and anti-
imperialism. … In the Turkish government’s view, there was nothing structurally 
wrong with the Turkish economy or with the economic development policies 
followed in Turkey between 1960 and 1978. … All that was needed to restore the 
situation was additional foreign financing and the rescheduling of short-term debts to 
help the balance of payments, and a period of restraint in public sector finances to 
control internal inflation.”54 
 
As the import shortages intensified and government-controlled commodities such as sugar, 
cigarettes, and cooking oil became increasingly expensive, the public was discontent with 
the inability of the government to deal with the crisis. The Ecevit government fell in 
October 1979 and Demirel came to power again the following month. 
 
The highest priority of the new government was to implement the second standby 
agreement negotiated under the previous government. In fact, this reform package was 
                                                 
53 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 268. 
54 Osman Okyar, “Turkey and the IMF: A Review of Relations, 1978-1982”, in IMF 
Conditionality, edited by John Williamson (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1983); via Krueger and Aktan, Swimming Against the Tide, p. 
36. 
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basically the one that was launched in January 1980, after the responsibility for its 
implementation had been assigned to the under-secretary for economic affairs, Turgut Özal. 
 
During the spring of 1980, however, a widespread resistance to the reform package and 
austerity measures continued and grew. Obviously, the agony and longevity of this 
economic crisis did not have purely economic causes: it had political aspects as well. 
Namely, the opposition to proposed measures was coming from trade unions that had 
grown incredibly strong from the 1960s onward.55 Trade unions like DĐSK and Türk-Đş had 
passed under control of the Turkish Communist Party so they became very politicized and 
radical. They had been asking for wage increases and winning them in the years preceding 
the crisis. In addition, there was a sort of competition among different trade unions as to 
who would be more progressive in demands: one was forcing the other to become more 
politically radical, not to be accused of class betrayal. For a long time, rise in wages helped 
expanding domestic market. But from the mid-1970s, expansion of domestic market 
reached its limits and costs of wage increases were more and more emphasized. 
 
The proposed austerity package implied a stop of the real wage increases, a stop of printing 
paper money and a larger part of domestic market directed to export, trying to bring almost 
equilibrium between imports and exports. Business class, with the MESS (Madeni Eşya 
Sanayıcı Sendikası – Metallic Products Industrialists’ Union) as its center was very vocal in 
calling for austerity measures.56 There were no signs of either side, business or trade 
unions, backing down. Already in the summer of 1978, when negotiations with the IMF 
and World Bank started, strikes against the austerity measures virtually paralyzed industrial 
production, and continued intensifying during 1979 and 1980. 57 
                                                 
55 The reform package was often referred to as the “Chilean solution” – a reference to 
the policies of General Pinochet introduced in Chile after his coup against president 
Allende. (Cf. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 268.) 
56 Business class was particularly dissatisfied with Ecevit’s government: many 
industrialists had to close down factories or even leave them over to the workers-
strikers; many left the country (they “left the sinking ship”). (Cf. Birand, The Generals’ 
Coup in Turkey, p. 46.) 
57 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 45. 
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The situation was deadlocked: Turkey could escape from the economic quagmire only with 
an acute and decisive action by the government; however, successive governments did not 
have popular support for their economic reforms and were facing labor difficulties. The 
January 1980 reform package was going to be fully implemented only after the military 
takeover of September 1980, making Turkey a show-case for IMF’s new policy and 
interventions. 
 
 
 
4. International Political Context 
 
 
 
In part, the social crisis in Turkey and, later on, the way it would be resolved, reflected 
certain changes in broader regional and global context. The intricate balance of power 
between the two great blocks of the post-World Word II world order, the Western liberal-
democratic block (with NATO) and the Eastern communist block (with the Warsaw Pact), 
started to change in the late 1970s. Around 1979 the period of relative stability and détente 
came to end and the so-called “Second Cold War” began, with new conflicts emerging and 
both sides becoming more militaristic. Consequently, Western alliance had new 
expectations from Turkey, its old NATO ally, and this profoundly affected the internal 
political life in Turkey. 
 
There were several developments in the global political scene that can be considered as 
causes of the escalation of the Cold War. We will focus on two: Iranian revolution and 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Coincidentally, they both took place in the Middle Eastern 
region, thus had a more direct effect on geopolitical significance of Turkey in international 
politics. 
 
Iran witnessed Islamic revolution on 16 January 1979. The deposed Iranian shah had 
played a prominent pro-American role in the Middle East (the USA had diverse benefits, 
such as the share of Iran’s oil wealth; they exerted strong influence mainly through Iranian 
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secret service and armed forces). With the new leader, Ayatollah Khomeini coming to 
power, all US military bases and monitoring installations were closed down. The 
Americans were deprived of military facilities which meant an end to vital electronic 
surveillance that had been able to penetrate into the Soviet heartland.58 
 
The “loss” of Iran upped the “value” of Turkey in the Middle East for the US. However, 
Turkey was a less stabile and less reliable partner than Iran. Iran had been an absolutist 
state with the Shah clearly siding with the US interests. Turkey, on the other hand, could 
not offer the same pliability since it had a quarrelsome parliament and also an extra-
parliamentary opposition – for example, a vivid left which was opposed to “American 
imperialism”. 
 
An already volatile political life in Turkey was in danger of becoming even more unstable 
because of the revolution in the neighboring country.59 Namely, the Islamic revival of the 
Iranian revolution could easily spread like a prairie fire across the Islamic world, thus 
strengthening the Islamic element in Turkey. Indeed, despite of the decades of Kemalist 
Westernization in Turkey, 98% of the population was declared Muslims – and although 
most of them were not radical, there was a significant presence of the NSP which had 
already had an established position in Turkish politics; already emergence of pro-Khomeini 
paramilitary groups, adding to the escalation of street terror was detected. Further, Iranian 
revolution made the Kurdish uprising in Eastern Turkey even more likely. Iranian Kurds 
that had been systematically oppressed under the Shah’s regime (for example, bombing of 
Kurdish villages each spring and autumn, obstacles for Kurds in finding jobs) were on the 
offensive with the change of the regime and they were close to autonomy.60 
 
                                                 
58 Ibid., p. 66. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 68. 
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Nevertheless, Turkey now became the most important Western ally in the Middle East, 
replacing Iran and becoming a buffer zone in the defense of the Middle East and Europe.61 
Yet, its security and reliability had to be enforced: “Turkey needs stability” became the 
main motto in the Western military and diplomatic circles and could be heard time and 
again in Washington and other major capitals of the Western alliance. But they were 
seriously concerned that Turkey was heading in the opposite direction.62 
 
US State Department found it very difficult to get along with prime minister Ecevit in the 
sense of conducting new policies that would modify the role of Turkey in the Middle East 
and in relation to the eastern block. For instance, Ecevit did not let the Americans use the 
Đncirlik base for clandestine U-2 spy flights over the Soviet territory because it could 
provoke Soviet retaliation against Turkey.63  
 
From early 1979 onwards (still during the rule of Ecevit), the focus in Turkish-American 
relations switched towards economic and financial issues. Washington realized that Turkey 
was in desperate economic straits with a large foreign dept and they knew that economic 
collapse could lead to upheavals and strong anti-Western sentiments. A moratorium on dept 
loans to the country was out of question because this would give a bad precedence to the 
indebted Latin American and African countries. That is why Washington placed an effort to 
reach an agreement between Turkey and the IMF on the top of its agenda (however, as the 
                                                 
61 Concretely, the idea of Turkey as a buffer zone would mean that Turkey would, for 
example, delay a potential Soviet invasion towards Western Europe for about 12 hours 
in the plains of Konya. (Cf. ibid., p. 121.) 
62 Ibid., p. 65 and p. 73. 
63 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s principal foreign affairs advisor, commented on the 
issue: “You can’t get anywhere with this man [Ecevit]” (ibid., p. 72). Interestingly, 
Ecevit was not favorably regarded in the Soviet Union either, despite of his leftist 
leanings and efforts to seek rapprochement with the Soviets. One reason was the 
Soviets’ ideological mistrust of the social-democratic model which they tended to see 
as a Trojan horse with an unclear stand in the East-West division. Another reason was 
related to the delicate position of Turkey in the Cold War balance: unstable Turkey 
could eventually change its position in the equilibrium between the two camps, which 
could trigger off difficult, perhaps even bloody consequences. Therefore, somewhat 
surprisingly, the USSR’s stand towards Turkey was the same as that of the US: they 
wanted a stabile Turkey. (Cf. ibid., p. 76-77.) 
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IMF was now faithful to its new policy, the aid was accompanied by various conditions, 
most importantly a prescription for a free market economy which made negotiations 
deadlocked; cf. chapter 2).64 
 
Another crucial event was the USSR invasion of Afghanistan on 26 December 1979 (this 
was during Demirel’s administration in Turkey). The invasion was the turning point that 
triggered off “the second Cold War”. West interpreted the Soviet move as a strategy 
directed to the oil-fields of the Gulf: they argued that the Soviets had lost their prestige in 
the world after being rejected by Anwar Sadat of Egypt. They wanted to reverse this by 
military involvement in Ethiopia and Southern Yemen and pursued a domino expansionist 
strategy.65  
 
In January 1980, US president Jimmy Carter unequivocally declared the Gulf as vital for 
US and Western interests: he stated that the West would oppose any Soviet penetration to 
the region (the so-called “Carter Doctrine”).66 For this purpose a new military concept was 
introduced: “rapid deployment force” (RDF). Its function was to intervene at any Middle 
Eastern trouble spot effectively and at short notice. If the Soviets were to threaten vital raw 
materials flow to the West and the shipping lanes upon which these depended, this force 
would deter such an advance.67 Anwar Sadat of Egypt immediately offered bases to the 
RDF. Now all eyes were focused on Turkey, with its Eastern region that was a particularly 
good location for the RDF, and was regarded as lynchpin of the new strategy.68 
 
However, Washington’s analysis of Turkey was still – or even more than before – 
pessimistic. The continuous emphasis on stability for the country meant in practice that, 
                                                 
64 Ibid., p. 73. 
65 Ibid., p. 116. 
66 Ibid., pp. 118-119. To illustrate the importance of the Gulf oil reserves for Western 
economy: European NATO allies depended on Gulf oil supplies for 80% of their total 
oil requirements. (Cf. ibid., p. 119.) 
67 Ibid., p. 118. 
68 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
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first, even a tiniest presence of left became intolerable, and second, political Islam was 
undesirable (Erbakan of the NSP was regarded as a Trojan horse of religious 
fundamentalism). Ecevit had not been flexible enough. But Demirel, although long 
perceived as the closest to the West among Turkish politicians, did not completely fit their 
needs either: he relied too strongly on the NSP.69 The question for Washington now was 
who would be the most willing to cooperate, to implement the needed economic reforms 
and able to establish law and order in the country. Although the economic reform package 
was launched under Demirel’s government, it was virtually stopped by the wave of strikes. 
Therefore there seemed to have been nobody in the Turkish political arena who could move 
against the left and stopped the wave of strikes, neutralize the Islamic stirrings in the 
country, while being pro-Western at the same time: only the army was regarded as capable 
of dealing with these problems.70 Indeed, the Letter of Warning, published by the Turkish 
Armed Forces in December 1979/January 1980, expressing concerns over the situation in 
the country, such as threats to national unity and integrity, lack of protection of person and 
property etc., gave Washington a signal that a coup was on the way; Washington, in return, 
increased the volume of its indirect signals to the Turkish military members.71 
 
 
 
5. The Military 
 
 
 
This chapter represents a digression from the chronological course followed so far: we go 
back in time, examining the role that the military played in the foundation of republic and 
                                                 
69 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
70 Ibid., p. 124. 
71 Ibid., pp. 124-125. Washington could not directly support a military takeover. If they 
were directly asked about the desirability of a coup, they would have been obliged to 
say no. But they did give signals about it, for example, questions posed to Turkish 
generals on cocktail parties like “In view of the deteriorating situation in your country, 
what do the armed forces intend to do?”, or “I hope that you will not allow things to get 
out of hand in Turkey” (ibid., p. 172). 
For the Letter of Warning, see chapter 5.6. of this thesis. 
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its importance in the construction of Turkish cultural identity; we look at the cultural 
attitudes of the public in Turkey towards the military as an institution and the military 
service in particular, from its beginnings until now. The second section deals with the 
organizational structure of the military, which has not changed crucially since the late 
1970s. The third section talks about the military’s system of recruitment and education in 
military academies, with special regard to the officers’ self-perception and their perception 
of politics and politicians, a perception rooted in their education; of particular interest in 
this section is the official ideological doctrine of the military (Ataturkism). The fourth 
section is a sociological assessment of the military’s ideology, its categorization within the 
spectrum of political ideologies; based on that, we try to explain certain contradictions 
within that ideology, for example, why the military tends to draw itself out of its 
elementary domain into the realm of politics. Coming back to the historical line, in the fifth 
section we summarize the military takeovers before 1980, and finally return to the 
military’s involvement in the events of the late 1970s. 
 
 
 
5.1. Cultural Importance of the Military in Turkey 
 
 
In a broader socio-cultural sense, military is believed to be inextricably linked to Turkish 
nationhood and history. The idea that Turkish nation is fundamentally a military nation is 
shared by Turkish masses and transmitted from parents to children. This idea is 
illustratively captured in the slogan “every Turk is born a soldier” (“Her Türk asker 
doğar”) expressed in daily conversations, educational institutions and used in training 
during military service.72 To majority of Turks, the military and military values lie at the 
heart of what it means to be Turkish; the institution of the Turkish military is seen as 
embodiment of the highest values of Turkish nation, while military officers enjoy an image 
of model citizens in the eyes of Turkish public. 
 
                                                 
72 Ayşe Gül Altınay, The myth of the military-nation: militarism, gender, and education 
in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 13. 
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For males, military service is seen as a passage into adulthood/manhood. Especially in rural 
areas only men who have served the military are considered as possible candidates for 
marriage. In the evening before a conscript is off to military service, his family and friends 
celebrate his induction in the streets, dancing and singing patriotic songs. Turkish national 
holidays (of which nearly all represent military victories) are marked by celebrations that 
include military parades.73 
 
This rural folk understanding of military service as a passage to manhood is coupled with 
an understanding of the military and military virtues as something that has always been in 
the core of Turkish nation, its ever-present defining feature ever since the nation’s origins 
in Central Asia. This is not only a popular belief; it is an elaborated theory shared by many 
academics. As an example, Ayşe Gül Altınay in her book The Myth of the Military-<ation 
quotes Halil Đnalcık, a prominent historian of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey who argued 
that “the Turkish nation has conserved its military-nation characteristic from the beginning 
of its history till today” and that “Turks are used to living as hakim (dominant) and efendi 
(master)”.74 In this theory, “Turk” is seen as “marching on the forefronts of world history 
… because of his unshakable national characteristics, military character, his grand military 
virtues and his ability to engage in total war for his rights and freedom. The Turk has 
inherited this character from his history that goes back thousands of years”.75 
 
The theory of Turks as a military nation from time immemorial has its roots mainly in the 
early Republican period (1930s) and partly in the late Ottoman period. The beginning phase 
of the Turkish Republic was a time when Turkish ethnic identity was not yet finally defined 
and “constructed” – however, its first contours had already been drawn in the late Ottoman 
period when the Ottoman state was taking measures to become a modern nation-state with 
                                                 
73 Gareth Jenkins, Context and circumstance: the Turkish military and politics (Oxford: 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2001), pp. 13-14. 
74 Altınay, The myth of the military-nation, p. 13. 
75 Halil Inalcık, “Osmanlı Devrinde Türk Ordusu”, Türk Kültürü 22 (August 1964), p. 
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a centralized administrative structure, a modern education system and a citizen army.76 This 
was roughly a time when Turkish national ideology (at the time called “Turkism”) was 
competing with Ottomanism and Islamism (or “Pan-Islamism”) as means of maintaining 
ideological unity and keeping together a multireligious and multiethnic empire. By the end 
of Balkan Wars (1912-13), during which the Ottoman Empire lost most of its Balkan 
provinces and hence a considerable non-Muslim element of its population, Turkish 
nationalism was gaining prominence and turning into a program. It was first a program of 
the Union and Progress Party, and later, after the establishment of the Republic, of Mustafa 
Kemal and the People’s Party.77 
 
Turkish nationalism became an elaborated ideology particularly in the 1930s, when a 
number of historians and anthropologists worked on rewriting Turkish and Ottoman history 
(including Mustafa Kemal’s adopted daughter Afet Đnan). Two institutions, Turkish 
Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu) and Turkish Linguistic Society (Türk Dil Kurumu), 
under directives and close scrutiny of Mustafa Kemal were entrusted of research and 
intellectual production regarding Turkish historical narrative.78 Eventually, they produced 
what was called the Turkish History Thesis, a historical narrative explaining origin and 
evolution of Turks. To name a few arguments of the thesis: the Ottoman Empire was only 
one phase in the history of Turks; their original homeland was Turkistan (and not 
Mongolia); Turks are not members of yellow race but white race; Neolithic civilization was 
first created in Central Asia by Turks, who then introduced it to the rest of Asia, Europe 
and America; the Turks developed early civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt, etc.79 
 
During this period, Turkish national ideology became more racial in its outlook, compared 
to its earlier elaborations in the late Ottoman Empire, but most importantly, it added two 
new points to the definition of Turkish national identity and therefore two instances that 
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would curve into the historical consciousness of generations of Turks to follow. Firstly, 
Turkish history is a history of state-making. Turks were always forming states and they 
carried their skills as state-makers wherever they went.80 The Ottoman Empire was only 
one of many civilizations and states that they established; among them were also the Great 
Hun Empire in Central Asia, the Seljuks, and, following the Turkish-Ottoman Empire, the 
Turkish Republic.81 Secondly – and more importantly for the aims of this thesis – it was 
thanks to Turks being a military-nation that they could establish so many states in history.82 
Good example of this interpretation can be found on the webpage of the Turkish General 
Staff, where the first sentence under the “History” tab states: “The history of the Turks 
whose political order was developed in line with its military order dates 4000 years ago”, 
and continues with: “devoted soldiers as individuals, the Turks proved themselves to be an 
army-nation to the whole world. Beginning from the Turkish nations in Central Asia till 
today, being a soldier was not considered as a profession, since every Turk was regarded as 
a naturally born warrior.”83 
 
This narrative, however, was more a result of practical necessities of the time than an 
empirically undisputable theory. For centuries, most of the Ottoman subjects were not 
directly involved in military campaigns and defense of the country. Military activities were 
reserved for the standing army of Janissaries, professional warriors recruited mostly from 
the Balkans among the Christian population.84 They were a special social stratum, tied 
directly to the palace (Sultan being their commander). Ordinary subjects of the empire 
started to be involved with military institutions and practices during the 19th century, when 
universal conscription was introduced under influences from Europe (the system was 
initially based on Prussian Conscription Law of 1814). At the beginning, conscription 
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demanded recruitment of certain number of soldiers from each region (1839), and was only 
gradually and in several steps extended to all male subjects of the empire (1909).85 
 
The introduction of conscription, however, never became effectively universal under 
Ottoman rule. Military service was normally very unpopular and evasion was not an 
infrequent phenomenon throughout the 19th century. This was primarily due to the length of 
service.86 But other reasons also played a role: the state had difficulty in feeding, clothing 
and equipping its soldiers, and especially in wartime the conditions under which the army 
had to fight were atrocious. It was especially easy to evade the military service in the 
countryside where it was easy to go into hiding (“leaving for the mountains” to evade 
conscription was an established tradition in the Balkans and Anatolia).87 Apart from hiding, 
other means of evading were applied, such as leaving the country and taking a different 
nationality; Ottoman Muslims would convert to Christianity; some would mutilate 
themselves in order to be sent home (especially widespread in the Egyptian province).88 
There is even an entire category of Ottoman songs which depict conscription as a death 
sentence. On top of it, frequent evasions were going on in the light of the fact that 
conscription was not even yet fully universal: for instance, when conscription was 
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introduced in the Ottoman Balkan province of Bosnia during the 1860s, only one Bosnian 
man out of fifty would be recruited for the Ottoman army.89 
 
Military service was especially unpopular in the last period of the Ottoman Empire which 
witnessed frequent wars and territorial disintegration of the Empire. From 1912, the year of 
the First Balkan War, to 1923 when Republic was proclaimed, the country was virtually in 
constant warfare. Consequently, the number of deserters was extremely high. During the 
World War I, for instance, one-fourth of all recruits did not turn up. On the other hand, 
those that were recruited were more likely to die from cholera, typhus and dysentery than 
of wounds.90 Many would escape on the way to the battlefields and they would even 
receive assistance from the villagers (which proves that desertion was socially acceptable to 
the villagers). In popular perception, the military was most often associated with poor 
conditions, like lack of proper clothing and food, and a sense of war and loss (if you go on 
campaign you might never come back). By 1918, there were about half million deserters in 
the Ottoman Army, thus the army that was to undertake the Independence War was one 
with a very high rate of evasion and desertion.91 
 
Efficiency of conscription changed drastically during the 1920s and 1930s. First 
conscription law in the Republican period was passed in 1927. In 1932, the size of the 
Turkish army was still a little greater compared to 1922 (78,000 men). By 1940, this 
number increased to around 800,000.92 The success of government’s efforts to mobilize a 
strong military force was certainly much thanks to the change of discourse from the late 
Ottoman one that linked military service to war and loss, to the discourse that was 
developed in the 1930s along the lines of Turkish History Thesis and which now stated that 
military virtues are a crucial component of the Turkish national spirit, that the Turks are the 
                                                 
89 Odile Moreau, “Bosnian Resistance to Conscription in the Nineteenth Century”, in 
Arming the state: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia 1775-
1925, p. 131. 
90 Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice, 1844-1918”, p. 
85. 
91 Altınay, The myth of the military-nation, p. 28. 
92 Ibid., pp . 27-28. 
  32 
best soldiers because they carry the cultural elements that make them good soldiers etc.93 In 
other words, the discourse switched from seeing the military service as a necessity of the 
times, to the discourse that made military service a matter of tradition and basis of cultural 
identity.94 
 
Therefore, from the empirical and historical point of view, military and soldiering has not 
always been an essential part of “being Turkish”. However, once the importance of military 
was stressed and nurtured by concrete policies of the one-party period, the mandatory 
universal conscription and the military service started to be seen as a patriotic duty 
relatively fast for Turkish elites and most of the common citizens. It has continued to be so 
until this day. In the meanwhile, Turkish military as an institution has been somewhat 
modifying and improving its internal structure, based on different, mainly western models 
(Germany, USA).  
 
 
 
5.2. Organizational Structure of the Military 
 
 
The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), like most of the armies, are composed of the Army 
(land forces), the Navy, and the Air Force; apart from these, there is the Gendarmerie and 
the Coast Guard: these two have military functions, but they operate as part of internal 
security in peacetime and are subordinate to Ministry of Interior. TAF are mainly made up 
of conscripts commanded by a cadre of officers. They are the second largest army in 
NATO: in 2008, the combined troop strength of TAF was 1,040,000 personnel, including 
Gendarmerie, Coast Guard and reserves.95 Of this number, about 360,000 in the army and 
navy were conscripts. The officer corps comprises of around 104,500 personnel, of which 
                                                 
93 However, it is not yet clear how the state, in practical terms, managed to change 
conscription practices so effectively in only one decade. (Cf. ibid., p. 32.) 
94 Ibid., p. 29. 
95 “Country Profile: Turkey”, Library of Congress – Federal Research Division (August 
2008), p. 25 (http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Turkey.pdf) [accessed on 2 
February 2011]. 
  33 
approximately 60,000 serve in the army, 16,000 in the navy and 28,500 in the air force 
(data for 2000).96 
 
TAF are commanded by the Turkish General Staff (TGA), headed by the chief of staff. In 
other countries, the chief of staff is primarily a coordinator between services, but in TAF he 
is a commander of each of the individual services and is entitled to wear the uniform of the 
navy and air force as well as the army. Another distinction of TAF is that the chief of staff 
is usually an ex-chief commander of the army, while in some western countries the naming 
of chief of staff circulates between army, navy and air forces to ensure equal representation 
of interests of individual services. 
 
Internal organization of the TGS is a system of seven departments headed by so-called J-
Chiefs (J from “joint”, a term taken over from the American system): department for 
personnel; for collation and evaluation of intelligence from Turkish intelligence 
organizations; for operations, training, planning and exercises; for logistics; for 
determination of strategic policies, threat assessment, targeting, budgets and military 
agreements (arguably the most important department); for communications and electronics; 
for studies of military history and strategy.97 The J-chiefs constitute the foundations of 
General Staff Headquarters. J-officers assign duties to the relevant department heads. The 
departments consult with the relevant armed service or all three services and draft their 
proposals to be submitted to the J-Chief. The draft is then submitted for the approval of the 
chief of the general staff. If approved, orders are given for its implementation throughout 
the army services; if not, it is returned to J-Offices for change or revision. This is an 
efficient procedural system, because the orders signed by the chief of the general staff are 
communicated downwards without delay.98 
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The military is nominally subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense, but in practice 
the chief of staff is autonomous and ranks ahead of the Minister of National Defense to be 
second only to the prime minister. The Ministry has therefore responsibilities only over 
conscription, defense procurement and relations with other ministries. 
 
Another important body in the structure of the military is the Supreme Military Council, 
comprised of the prime minister, defense minister and (all) 15 four-star generals. It decides 
upon promotions and retirements of the military personnel. Similarly as with the relations 
between the chief of staff and defense minister, in theory, the SMC is chaired by the prime 
minister with the deputy chief of the General Staff acting as secretary, but in practice, it is 
the military which decides on appointments and promotions of officers. 
 
Probably the most important and controversial institution in Turkish civilian-military 
relations has been the National Security Council (NSC). It was first established in 1961, 
with the constitution that was enacted the same year. It underwent several structural 
changes since then. The 1961 constitution set up the NSC “to recommend to the Council of 
Ministers the necessary basic guidelines regarding the coordination and the taking of 
decisions related to national security”.99 NSC was composed of ten members, five civilians 
and five military officers: prime minister, minister of national defense, minister of internal 
affairs, minister of foreign affairs, chief of TGS and the four commanders of the army, 
navy, air force and gendarmerie. It was chaired by the president of republic.100 The 1982 
constitution retained the same composition of the NSC, but it further strengthened its 
influence on civilian politics, since the Council of Ministers was obliged to “give priority 
consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council”.101 
 
Basically, the NSC was established after the deteriorating relations between the military 
and the government of Adnan Menderes during the 1950s, to ensure better communication 
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between the TGS and civilian politicians. It was a place where soldiers and politicians 
would discuss security, and other, sometimes acute, issues. Officially, its purpose was only 
to serve as advisory body to the civilian government, but in practice it often turned out to 
be a channel through which the military expressed its expectations or dissatisfaction with 
certain governmental policies or even with the conduct of civilian politics in general. 
 
 
 
5.3. Officers’ Education and World Outlook 
 
 
Each of the military services has its own military academy. Cadets normally enter it at the 
age of 19 for four years. Approximately half of the academy cadets are drawn from the 
graduates of military high schools (there are all together five of them); the other half is 
drawn from graduates from a variety of civilian high schools.102 Those from the military 
high schools usually make a more informed choice and are more ambitious.103 
 
Candidates for military high schools and especially academies have to undergo a rigorous 
selection process. The requirements are three-fold: academic, physical and ideological. 
There is a minimum score limit which the candidates have to surpass in their university 
entrance examinations. Candidates below this score would not be able to keep up with the 
pace of education at the academies. This exam is later followed by a special exam given by 
the military academy. Any physical shortcomings or abnormality are checked. The very 
short and excessively fat or thin, the flat-footed, the color-blind, as well as those with a 
legacy of serious illness in their past, are weeded out.104 The candidates also have to 
undergo physical tests like running 1600 meters in a given time and doing a certain number 
of push-ups. They have to obtain a report from the hospital proving they are fit to be a 
soldier.105 Final – and probably the most interesting – are ideological criteria. A 
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confidential investigation is carried out not only about the candidate himself, but about his 
family as well. The applicant is checked whether he has a police record. Further, academies 
do not admit students from the theological schools. They also check the occupation of 
applicant’s mother and father and if his parents have a good record. They investigate to find 
out whether any members of his family have been involved in political incidents, or have 
been convicted of left- or right-wing activities. Some of these investigations are based on 
records, but some rely on enquiries by the local police of the butcher or the greengrocer.106 
If a stain is found on a record of an even far relative of the candidate, this can result in the 
candidate’s immediate rejection, because it is believed that the candidate might have been 
influenced by undesirable ideas. 
 
Especially the last criteria are not only applied during the selection process: special 
attention is given to them throughout the whole education and training of cadets (we can 
say that the strictest watch is held over ideological matters). Mehmet Ali Birand describes a 
case of a military high school pupil who was summoned to see the commander of the 
school towards the end of his first year. The commander told him that he found about his 
cousin Ahmet. The pupil did not quite know who the commander was talking about 
because he had never met his cousin and only heard his name once. The commander got 
annoyed and criticized the boy for not telling before that his cousin was a trade unionist 
who went to prison for inciting strikes. The boy, not being able to explain that he did not 
know his cousin, was eventually expelled from the military school.107 
 
There are other rigorous principles adhered to in the training of young cadets in order to 
shape them into officers. Generally, there are five offences that military academies will not 
tolerate: violation of discipline, failure to get promotion, involvement in ideological or 
party activities, larceny, and homosexuality. Violations of these principles may result in 
penalties, impediments on promotion in future, or even expulsion – not only of those who 
commit the offence, but also of those who witness them or are aware of them but fail to 
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report them.108 Even later, in an officer’s career, violations such as infringement of traffic 
regulations can be an impediment to his promotion.109 Moreover, there have been massive 
expulsions from academies especially in periods of unrest. The biggest one occurred in 
May 1963 when 1,400 Army Academy students were expelled for participating in the 
second attempted post-1960 coup (as a result, there were no graduating classes from this 
academy in 1963 and 1964). Between 1977 and 1984, some 1,200 students and graduates 
were weeded out from the Army Academy.110 
 
Furthermore, during the four years in the academy, virtually every hour of the day of a 
cadet is prescribed and occupied with lessons, study or physical education. Students are 
free to leave on weekends, especially if they live in the same city. Otherwise, outside of the 
school year, they are entitled to only 45 days of a year to spend with their family. Hard 
work and obedience to commander’s orders without questioning are part of the training. On 
admission to the academy cadets swear that they will sacrifice their life for the country; in 
the academy they are taught that a land is a country if there is someone dying for its sake.  
 
The students, however, do not learn only the discipline and military skills: especially in 
high schools, they receive training to develop their social life, for example, how to go to the 
theatre for the first time, how to applaud, or how to eat in a restaurant and order a meal.111 
Emphasis is made to make a courteous and gentlemanly individual, with knowledge of at 
least one foreign language and who will know how to behave in any circumstances. 
Therefore, the main aim of all this training is not only to create a skillful and competent 
military officer, but a complete personality in a much broader sense: expectations are not 
limited to working day and job post – they extend to officers’ leisure time and private life 
as well. M. A. Birand puts this nicely: “The academies are trying to create … an ideal Turk, 
the kind of Turk one dreams of. He is free of all the maladies thought to afflict Turkish 
society; he is extremely well-informed, trustworthy and has all the social graces; he is also 
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a proud and honorable warrior, a man of discipline and integrity.”112 Turkish officers are 
expected to be model citizens; this, then, has certain implicit assumptions such as getting 
married and raising a family, among others mentioned above.113 
 
 
 
5.3.1. Officers’ Self-perception 
 
 
Inevitably, among the cadets and later officers there is a sense of difference or isolation 
from the rest of Turkish society, and even a sense of superiority. In the academies it is 
frequently emphasized how different the cadets are from the outside. One significant reason 
why this feeling is inoculated into the cadets is that the academies and the military in 
general care strongly what people will think of them. Young cadets are obliged to wear 
their uniforms even on days off, outside of the walls of the military academy. Thus, even 
when going to a party or a discothèque, their clothes must be spotless and their shoes must 
be immaculate. They are warned to be mindful to all they do: 
 
   “Every single step you take involves the honor of the glorious Turkish army. Walk 
tall, chest out. Show that you are men prepared to perform a Turk’s loftiest duty. 
Hold your heads high. … Do not talk in a loud voice. In particular, never engage in 
horseplay in public, never trip up your fellow-students, and don’t play impromptu 
ball-games while in uniform.”114 
 
The consequence of school’s demands, as well as of the fact that students mainly come 
from various towns of Anatolia, away from the place where they study, is that they are 
unable to join a social circle outside the school. 
 
Same factors that distinguish them from the rest of society also raise them above it. It is 
common enough for the officers to develop a distinguished sense of moral superiority. 
While in academy, special emphasis is put to implanting certain moral values in them: they 
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learn about concepts like “devotion to the motherland”, “self-sacrifice” (that is, willingness 
to sacrifice your life for the sake of the country), “superiority”…, which is not the case in 
civilian schools, or at least it is not as emphasized as in military schools. Lesson about the 
military men’s excellence are very explicit: “Always bear in mind that you are superior to 
everyone and everything and that you are trained here to have superior knowledge and 
superior qualities.”115 So when the cadets come out of the academies, they feel that “their 
country is in their care and that they are its true champions”.116 
 
 
 
5.3.2. Guardians of Kemalism 
 
 
Certainly, this sense of superiority within the military strongly rests upon the fact that the 
first politicians of the Republic, including Atatürk, were themselves military officers, and 
on the fact that the military played a crucial role in the independence struggle of Anatolian 
Muslims and the establishment of the Republic. Until today, Kemalist legacy has been the 
ideological core of the military and of the teaching curriculum in military academies. 
However, the role and importance of Kemalism has not been static and the ideology itself 
has gone through some changes. Ataturkism became important during the 1970s, and 
especially after the 1980 coup (not only in barracks and military academies: after 1980 it 
also gained prominence in civilian education system). But it was less visible before 1980. It 
did not have a prominent place in the curriculum of the military academies of the 1940s. In 
fact, there was not such thing as Ataturkism, because Atatürk’s party, the RPP, was the 
only party, and the official ideology did not have a need to define and posit itself in 
opposition to other ideologies. M. A. Birand notes a conversation with an officer who held 
an administrative position in a military academy in the 1940s (conversation must have 
taken place during the 1980s, when the book was published): 
 
   “[Ataturkism] was natural, like eating and drinking. The officers regarded Atatürk 
as one of them and were at one with his principles and reforms. There was no need 
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for instruction in depth. … We did occasionally attend lectures or were assigned to do 
research on the subject, but that kind of instruction did not reach the dimensions it has 
today.”117 
 
This trend began to change after the 1950s, that is, after the decade of Adnan Menderes’ 
Democrat Party rule and the 1960 military intervention. Official state ideology during the 
1950s became faced with alternative views and political programs. For instance, the 
officers felt that the Democrat Party was exploiting religion for political purposes and 
deviating from the reforms and principles of Atatürk to attract more votes. Hence, after 
1960, Ataturkism became more prominent in textbooks and curricula and more time was 
devoted to study of the reforms. For example, in the 1960s there was a rise from 5% to 8-
9% in the number of hours of instruction of Ataturkism in the Military Academies.118 Study 
and teaching of Ataturkism would be further enforced with the rise of other competitive 
political ideologies, such as left-wing politics in the 1960s.119 
 
The best way to examine Ataturkism instructed in Military Academies is by focusing on 
some of its crucial points: significance of the War of Independence; Kemalist principles, 
together with the Dynamic Ideal; opposition to rival ideologies such as liberalism or 
socialism; perception of internal and external threats. 
 
The War of Independence (1919-23), a war that annulled the Treaty of Sèvres, prevented 
partition of Anatolia among the Allied countries after World War I, and followed by the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, is taught very systematically and with great 
enthusiasm. Young cadets learn almost every Atatürk’s action and daily events; they learn 
almost every battle by heart. Thus they internalize it deeply and they identify with the 
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person of Atatürk. Interestingly, Atatürk’s military aspect is more present than his civilian 
aspect – this is also manifested in the pictures in military facilities where Atatürk is 
generally dressed in a field marshal’s uniform.120 
 
Strong identification with the period of the War of Independence has certain material 
implications: cadets gradually adopt the idea of “saving the homeland”, as Atatürk and his 
followers did against external threats, on one hand (Greek, British and French armies in 
Anatolia), and internal threats on the other (for example, the reactionary Sheikh Said 
Rebellion in 1924 that opposed abolition of Chalifat and introduction of Western 
institutions, and was taken up mostly in the Kurdish region). 121 Even today, what the 
military identifies as a threat to the state is very similar to what it was in Atatürk’s time. 
Political Islam and Kurdish nationalism are seen as reactionary or separatist forces. 
Pressure or criticism from the international community – particularly from the West – for 
implementation or better convey of certain institutions and principles, such as human 
rights, are often seen as attempts to harm and divide the country. In this context, the events 
at the end of World War I, especially the Treaty of Sèvres, are being commonly evoked and 
referred to.122 
 
Moreover, future officers are compelled to study speeches of the Great Leader. Among 
them, the Great Speech of October 1927, the “Nutuk”, has a status similar to a sacred book 
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and his pronouncements on various subjects are taken as guidelines.123 These extend to 
almost all areas of life, from ideas of how politics and economy should function, to the 
conduct of family life.  
 
In a schematic way, these principles can be summarized in six points, or the so-called “six 
arrows” (six arrows are also a symbol of the Republican People’s Party, established in 1923 
by Atatürk and his colleagues). Many of them have roots in the War of Independence, but 
they became crystallized in its aftermath and were the ideological basis of various political 
and social reforms implemented throughout the 1920s and 1930s, until they were finally 
put together more systematically – and described as “Kemalism” – on the Fourth Congress 
of the CHP in 1935.124 These are:125 
 
1) Republicanism. It meant that it was only the republican regime, a constitutional 
democracy, which could best represent and realize the ideal of national sovereignty of 
Turkish nation. The establishment of the Republic was made possible as a result of 
people’s efforts during the War of Independence, therefore, it was to continue its existence 
for the good of the people and not for the good of any individual, group or dynasty. 
 
2) <ationalism. The republic was proclaimed by the National Assembly in Ankara that 
represented the Turkish nation. Turkish nation is the popular basis of the Republic and 
Turkishness is not determined by one’s race or place of origin but by one’s personal 
association with the ideals and goals of Turkish nation. 
 
3) Populism. The elite should rule the state towards the best interest of the general public, 
especially the common people, such as villagers and workers. 
 
Today, this principle is most often linked to democracy: “democracy and populism mean 
the same thing,” to quote a top-level officer: “‘In ancient times the Turkish nation proved 
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their adherence to the idea of democracy in the general assemblies they held to elect heads 
of state.’ Atatürk pointed out that populism was like an ever-rising sea which found its way 
into all modern constitutions.”126 
 
4) Étatism. The state was given primary role in the economic development of the country. 
It was to regulate or engage in economic activity in the country, especially in areas where 
private enterprise was not capable or not wiling to do so. Although the role of state is 
emphasized, this principle did not suggest public ownership of all the means of production: 
the rights to private property and private enterprise were recognized. 
 
Even today, étatism is strongly stressed (although, paradoxically, the sphere of private 
economy has become much larger). Cadets are taught that a powerful state is the most 
effective means of achieving the Dynamic Ideal (discussed below) and that the state must 
intervene wherever necessary, especially in the economic field.127 
 
5) Secularism. Separation of religion from state, as well as from educational, cultural and 
legal affairs. In practice, it meant realization of independence of thought (emphasis was on 
scientific thinking – an enlightenment ideal) and institutions from religious thinking. This 
principle, however, did not advocate atheism: it did not involve abolition but de-emphasis 
of Islam. It allowed “enlightened Islam” – a personal, non-political Islam that was 
compatible with positivist scientific thinking – but was against Islam that was opposed to 
modernization (ever since the 18th century the struggle of modernizing elites of the 
Ottoman Empire had been a struggle against religiously-driven reactionaries). 
 
Today, secularism is among the most extensively taught and emphasized principles of 
Atatürk. It is considered that, unless state and religion remain separate, the country may 
once more revert to a period of decline and may lose touch with developments in the 
modern world, and therefore surrender to foreign powers.128 
                                                 
126 Birand, Shirts of Steel, p. 60. 
127 Ibid., p. 62. 
128 Ibid., p. 63. 
  44 
 
6) Reformism (revolutionism). The country should replace the traditional, backward, 
medieval institutions with modern institutions based on contemporary Western models. In 
the context of the one-party period, this implied social and political reforms, such as the 
language reform (replacement of Arabic letters with Latin alphabet; cleaning of Turkish 
language from Arabic and Persian influences), universal suffrage etc. with a goal to 
completely modernize Turkey. Reforms should be employed continuously, whenever an 
urge would occur, to maintain the country’s modern character and keep it in pace with the 
modern world. 
 
Nowadays, in the military this principle is interpreted as changing the established 
institutions by force, that is, in words of a top-ranking general of the General Staff, 
“destroying those institutions which hindered the progress of the Turkish nation … and 
replacing them with new ones which will raise the nation to the highest level of 
civilization.”129 
 
To the above mentioned ideals we can add the Dynamic Ideal. Cadets learn that Ataturkism 
is not a static ideology but one that undergoes a “dynamic” development according to the 
conditions of the time. This means that it is not inflexible like other ideologies, but keeps 
changing in the light of previous experience and progressing towards the “ideal”: “dynamic 
component of Kemalism gives the other principles not only chance for development but a 
certain commitment to development; and it helps to maintain the open character of this 
ideology; and it prevents the ideology from being an ideology of the status quo by keeping 
it committed to a continuing process of modernization”.130 A powerful state is seen as the 
best way to the Dynamic Ideal.131 
 
Ataturkism is further specified as being opposed to some other ideologies or theories, such 
as trade unionism, or communism, or even capitalism (and liberalism). Particularly during 
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the 1920s and 1930s, Kemalism positioned itself in direct opposition to these ideologies 
which were alive either in the West (liberalism) or in the Soviet Union (bolshevism) – in 
both cases present in important and influential regions neighboring Turkey. It reputed all of 
these systems as not being suitable for Turkish mind-set and cultural heritage. 
 
Regarding the relationship between Kemalism and liberalism we can say that for liberals, 
roughly speaking, the welfare of the individual, the citizen, is the main goal. A good 
society is consisted of free and materially provided individuals that are seeking to satisfy 
their private and egotistic interests (as far as the law allows them) which results in a better 
welfare of a society as a whole. Kemalism rejected liberalism because of its emphasis on 
the individual and the individuals’ interest representation in politics; in words of a Turkish 
officer, member of the TGS: 
 
   “The theory of the representation of interest groups is rooted in the diversity of 
interests represented by various professional groups, artists, and businessmen, each 
group being a separate entity in society. Thus, it is claimed that such groups will seek 
their private interests … Who will stop them from working only in their own 
interests if some of these groups join forces in the representative assembly and come 
to power? Accordingly, we do not think that … this particular theory … is suitable 
for our nation.”132 
 
The relationship between Kemalism and socialism was more complex. In the 1920s, there 
was a spread of socialist activities and movements in Anatolia, mainly under the Soviet 
influence. Turkish Communist Party was established in Baku and it was under the control 
of Soviet Comintern. In Anatolia the “Green Army” was established in 1920 with the 
specific aim to reconcile Islamic doctrine with that of communism. Atatürk relied on its 
military troops for guerilla warfare against Greek forces, prior to the formation of the 
regular army.133 Atatürk and Vladimir I. Lenin even signed a friendship treaty in 1921 that 
included clause of non-aggression between Turkey and Soviet Union and Soviet military 
                                                 
132 Ibid., pp. 61-62 (words in italics marked by M.T.). 
133 Sinan Ciddi, Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, 
secularism and nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 17. 
  46 
help to Turkey, without accepting Soviet hegemony.134 However, despite the fact that 
Kemalists tolerated socialist developments in Anatolia, they never felt at ease with them. 
They turned a blind eye to them because of the pragmatic needs of the time, but they 
regarded socialism as non-compatible with Turkish nationalism. Socialist notion of struggle 
between the classes and intra-national antagonisms was an anathema to nationalist ideals of 
national unity, coherence and solidarity. Kemal in one of his speeches emphasized the 
difference between forming an alliance with Bolsheviks and becoming a Bolshevik and 
rejected the latter.135 Here is what a member of the General Staff in the post-1980 period 
says about socialist ideology and its role in education in military academies (which is 
particularly important to understand the developments before the 1980 military takeover): 
 
   “Under the Bolshevik theory, a minority composed of workers, and officers of the 
navy and army have united in the economics-based Communist Party and established 
a dictatorship. They have no national goals, no respect for the sovereignty of the 
people, and recognize neither equality nor the freedom of the individual. At home 
they forcibly impose their own views on the majority of the people, and abroad they 
try to spread their principles to the international community through propaganda and 
revolutionary organizations. … Theoreticians of revolutionary political syndicalism 
are workers’ groups who would have all political organizations work only in their 
interest, so that they can eventually take over political power and sovereignty. 
Waiting for an opportunity to achieve their aims by force, they occasionally organize 
general strikes, thereby making their presence felt and exercising their influence on 
the government to have certain matters solved in their favor.”136 
 
Going back to Kemalism and the military: the military of the one-party period was 
completely imbedded in Kemalist principles. After all, the RPP was “a product” of the 
military, and many officers, after retirement from the army, joined the ranks of the RPP. 
The reforms and the principles of Kemalism composed a platform around which the RPP 
and the military were unified.137 
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Moreover, although some of the Kemalist principles have been modified in the course of 
the 20th century, or even abolished, and some novelties introduced, the general attitude of 
the military has remained unchanged; it is best contained in the words of Atatürk himself, 
namely his speeches from the last years of his life: “Our army is the steellike expression of 
Turkish unity, of Turkish power and ability, and of Turkish patriotism. Our army is the 
undefeatable assurance of our systematized activity to realize the Turkish ideal, and to 
protect the land of Turkey.”138 The following quote, dating from 1938, a few days before 
his death, was his last message to the Turkish army: “The brave Turkish army … always 
carries the torch of civilization along with its victories. As you have protected and saved 
the country from oppression, catastrophy; and calamities in times of difficulty and crisis, I 
have no doubts that you will do your duty with the same loyalty … in the progressive 
atmosphere of today’s Republic.”139 Indeed, future cadets, having gone through intensive 
Ataturkist education, assume a role of those who should “guard and protect the existing 
order” and keep “Atatürk’s torch alight”.140 
 
We should note that Kemalism, which has always been the foundation of the military’s 
world outlook, has been taught even more vigorously over the last 25-30 years. Cadets do 
not only learn and internalize his speeches – they even regard Atatürk as having an almost 
physical presence in their lives. For example, on 13 March each year, the anniversary of 
Atatürk enrolling as a cadet, at morning rollcall an officer calls out Atatürk’s name and the 
cadets respond in unison: ‘Present!’ Some of them weep or faint when they visit Atatürk’s 
tomb in Ankara or during commemorative ceremonies on the anniversary of his death on 
10 November. 141 Cadets who have graduated from the military academies over the last two 
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and a half decades are probably even more committed to Kemalism than the officers 
currently filling the highest echelons in the TGS.142 
 
Lastly, we should also note that, although the six principles are covered extensively and in 
great detail, with examples from Atatürk’s speeches, Military Academy graduates seem to 
have a confusion of some concepts in their minds. This becomes clear especially when it 
comes to the understanding of other ideologies. For example, there are significant 
differences among the currents that are summarily known as the “left”: social democracy, 
socialism, communism, and there are even tensions between them. However, the mind of a 
cadet generally tends to see the left as a single concept.143 In general, the cadets find it 
difficult to discuss the abstract characteristics of Kemalism as an ideology when they are 
asked (many even deny that it is an ideology): the majority ends up superficially talking 
about the six arrows symbolizing the six principles, while their point of identification is 
manly the more concrete War of Independence and Atatürk’s deeds in that war.144 One 
reason for this probably lies in the fact that cadets do not have a habit of engaging in extra 
reading or in-depth research. Though even if they wanted, they might not find it easy: 
purpose of the academies is to keep them from alternative political ideologies and 
movements. As mentioned above, they can be dismissed from the academy even if a distant 
relative of theirs was engaged in extreme left- or right-wing activism. Further, books and 
periodicals stocked in the libraries are carefully censored. Left-wing and religious 
publications are not allowed. Anyone seen with publications not stamped as “readable” by 
the head of office is penalized. Also, when an external lecturer or guest speakers are 
invited, care is taken to select those that are not liberal in their outlook.145 
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5.3.3. Officers’ Perception of Civilian Politicians and Politics 
 
 
The officers’ peculiar sense of superiority and elitist culture, together with a feeling of 
moral duty to guard Kemalist principles, further leads to a very peculiar way in how they 
perceive civilian politicians. In the eyes of an officer, politics is dirty work because it leads 
to favor personal interests over preserving the interests of the nation. An officer who is 
politically minded or actively engaged in party politics is not looked upon favorably by his 
colleagues. They would condemn him in terms like “pity about our commander!”146 They 
tend to see politics as a “mess”, and officers who engage in politics as those that “got into a 
mess”.147 Further, a person who talks vaguely about his intention is mocked and accused of 
“talking like a politician”, and if an officers’ meeting went noisy, it is generally likened to 
the National Assembly.148 Indicatively, after the introduction of democratic elections, only 
a handful of retired soldiers attempted to engage in active politics (none with any 
success).149 
 
However, although cadets are taught to stay out of politics and cultivate a dislike/distrust of 
politicians, they are nevertheless – somewhat paradoxically – also taught of what 
politicians and political parties ought to be like. In other words, the instruction in 
Ataturkism that they receive in schools is not an abstract theory or merely a history course. 
Cadets get very concrete prescriptions of how Turkish politics should function, and these 
prescriptions are, in fact, a direct application of Ataturkist principles onto Turkish politics. 
For instance, there is a special chapter that talks about ideal political parties in the textbook 
used in the Military Academies; it begins with the words “parties are responsible for 
achieving the Dynamic Ideal of the state”.150 
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The general conviction is that Ataturkism explains the duties and courses for those in 
responsible positions in the fundamental institutions and these people should plan in detail 
the course of action that will allow them to perform those duties successfully. This general 
outline is specified by concrete definitions and principles of republican democracy: what 
the parties in the Grand National Assembly should be like, what qualifications politicians 
should have and how the opposition should function. To put it briefly, political parties are 
responsible for administering a firm state authority, which defends the principles of 
republicanism, nationalism, populism, étatism and secularism, an authority which will 
ensure the full security of its citizens, as well as order and discipline.151 
 
Although special emphasis is put on the principle of populism, and officers truly believe 
that plurality of parties should faithfully represent preferences of the people, expressed 
through elections, nevertheless, there are certain limitations to what the parties are 
supposed to do: 
 
   “Political parties should not promise to meet all the wishes of the people. This is 
damaging for democracy, and fails to be convincing. It is natural for the people to 
press for their needs, but they cannot fully consider how this can be accomplished. 
Political parties, on the other hand, have to consider the people’s needs and wishes in 
the light of the existing means and of the future and general well-being of the 
country.”152 
 
To be fair, this view is not peculiar to Turkish understanding of democracy, nor is it 
something non-democratic: we can find similar ideals in Western democracies (criticisms 
of demagogy, emphasis on pursuit of general and long-term interest instead of winning 
cheap election points etc.). However, the desired limitations become interesting when it 
comes to the role of parties that constitute the opposition: 
 
   “According to Ataturkism, parties and individuals in opposition should try to 
disseminate their own political views and be critical of the party in power, but their 
criticism should not be damaging to national unity. They should be constructive, 
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rational, and realistic in their opposition, and bear in mind the interests of the 
country in criticizing the mistakes of the party in power.”153 
 
The term “constructive opposition” is understood as “not to divide the nation or incite 
clashes of interest of class”: “The struggle between the parties should be of a positive and 
constructive nature. There should be no place for divisive politics which would run against 
national interests.”154 Basically, this means that political parties should not represent class 
interests (this severely limits activity of Marxist parties) and that parties, no matter what the 
ideological outlook, should not create hostility among the people. Instead, their principle 
aim “should be to establish social order and solidarity”.155 
 
Obviously, through their education, young cadets get a refined picture of what relations 
between the government and opposition should be like. They are also taught about “an 
ideal politician”, one that will not pursue his personal or party interests at the expense of 
national interest. However, it is almost inevitable in every democracy that relations 
between parliamentary parties are not always harmoniously coordinated and that political 
parties pursue partial interests of their base – that is, of a section of society instead of the 
general interest, and they naturally struggle for power and influence; cadets’ opinion of 
politicians deteriorates as they are learning about the realities of day-to-day politics. The 
military’s image of politicians is emphatically negative. 
 
To give just a few examples to illustrate this disrespect of politicians, here is a quotation 
from an interview with a military academy cadet who talks about the level of knowledge of 
politicians: 
 
   “Some politicians aren’t half as educated as we are. Some know one-tenth of what 
we do. How can they govern the country? … Some of them can’t even speak proper 
Turkish, let alone a foreign language as we do.”156 
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   “Some of our politicians are so ignorant that they’ve never really been aware of the 
dangers inside and outside the country.”157 
 
The following quote expresses a typical conviction about politicians’ concern for particular 
interests at the expense of national good: 
 
   “A politician doesn’t put his country above everything else as I do. His priority is 
his own re-election in four year’s time, though, in the meantime, he talks a lot about 
patriotism. He can abuse the state by indulging in favoritism to secure his re-election. 
I trust very few of them …”158 
 
It should be noted, though, that these views are not limited to the military: many civilians 
share the same negative image of politicians (stereotypes of politicians as untrustworthy 
selfish liars etc.). The difference, however, is that the civilians may be more aware of their 
own faults and misgivings, while officers are more self-confident and educated not to allow 
any deficiency, thus les tolerant towards errors in the political sphere (curiously, in almost 
all of the above-mentioned quotes, there is an instance of comparison between “the 
politician and me” – between politicians and officers).159 
 
 
 
5.4. Kemalism and Corporatism 
 
 
It is apparent that the military’s notion of democracy is very different from civilians’ and 
politicians’ notion of democracy. Furthermore, the military’s notion is quite different from 
the notions in Western countries that have an established democratic political culture. Then, 
of course, there is also a gap between the military’s notion of democracy and the actually-
functioning democracy, “democracy at work” in Turkey. This contradiction leads us to the 
following question: 
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What are the Turkish Armed Forces really after? What political order do they favor, if not 
democracy in its standard definition? 
 
What they actually want, we can say, is a model of society that “combines discipline, 
proper organization, disregard for self-interest in favor of the homeland, cooperation, unity 
and constructiveness.” There is a name for it in sociology: it is called corporatism. 
 
Corporatist ideology, first formulated at the turn of 19th century, was primarily a response 
to what was seen as weakening of public morality and weakening of ties between 
individuals in modern capitalist societies. Moral decadence was seen as a consequence of 
individualistic norms, on the one hand, and of functional specialization brought about by 
the division of labor, on the other. Corporatism postulates that this anomaly can be 
overcome if society is organized as an organic whole consisting of mutually interdependent 
and functionally complementary parts. These parts are called occupational groups, 
professional organizations, or corporations. They consist of individuals working in the 
same industry or sector of economy, and employees and employers are merged within the 
same group.160 People are socialized within these groups, as they share their lifetime 
activities with other members of the same corporation, and they make their living in them. 
Corporations mold the individual to be proper participant in social and political life as a 
member of his or her specific unit of society (but not as an abstract individual); they 
constitute the primary building blocks of political and social life.161 The role of the state is 
to direct, supervise and manage relations between occupational associations, thus maintain 
order. Accordingly, the state may assign different weight and value to different 
occupational groups.162 
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In the liberal model of society, the main unit of political activity is the individual, with his 
or her prerogatives against the state. The main mechanisms of interest articulation are 
groups and political parties, which are organized by the individuals whose interests 
coincide – and when they coincide. Such groups can dissolve when the common goal 
which was uniting the group is achieved. The major institution in which the articulated and 
aggregated interests are transformed into political decisions and policies is the parliament. 
In the corporatist paradigm, by contrast, the major political units of political life are not the 
atomistic individuals and the changeable groups but the before-mentioned well-defined and 
constant occupational groups. The governmental structure in which corporately organized 
interest groups and the state meet is either a parliament, or corporative councils organized 
in pyramidal form. Corporatism is not tied to a single political system: it can coexist with 
multi-party system (which becomes subordinate to corporative interests) or it may exist in a 
single-party regime, where different associations are made organs of the party.163 
 
A corporatist society is not the mere sum of individuals – society is believed to be greater 
than the numerical total of individuals. This leads to the next important principle of 
corporatism – the public interest does not result from individual pursuit of self-interest: that 
is to say, the individual’s pursuit of his or her interests – especially those associated with 
private property – is considered legitimate only as long as it serves social solidarity and 
does not violate the public interest. This implies a “visible hand” in economic life, 
regulation and intervention in economy by the state. However, regulation does not go as far 
as in socialism, for corporatism is in fact not anticapitalist as such. It does not reject the 
fundaments of capitalist economy, such as private property and enterprise. We can say that 
corporatism seeks to replace liberalism (as the superseding rationale of modern capitalism) 
but not capitalism itself; it seeks to eliminate the profit-maximizing logic of capitalism and 
individualistic atomism, without abolishing capitalism.164 
 
Therefore corporatism is not at all equal to socialism. In fact, when corporatism came about 
in the 19th century, and especially during the first half of 20th century when the world 
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witnessed actual socialist regimes for the first time, corporatism came to be known as the 
“Third Way ideology” – a political ideology that “pursued capitalist modernity and societal 
transformation but rejected both an individualist version of liberalism and a class-based 
vision of society and social transformation of socialism”.165 Being opposed both to 
Western-type liberalism and Soviet-type socialism, corporatism rejected not only the 
category of individual but also the category of class. While the individualism of the liberal 
model was seen as too atomistic and consequently disruptive of social equilibrium, the 
struggle and warfare of classes in the socialist model was also viewed as detrimental to 
maintenance of the social system.166 
 
Although corporatism, with its critique of atomism and disintegration of social texture in 
modern capitalist society does bare some resemblance with Marx’s critique of alienation, 
this resemblance is misleading. Instead of conflict and antagonism between the workers 
and capitalists, proletariat and bourgeoisie, corporatism merges the members of these two 
groups into a same, cohesive corporation, while ensuring coordinated and unconflicting 
coexistence between different corporations. Thus the end to which the corporatist critique 
is directed is not the abolition of human power differentials that emerge out of capitalist 
class structure, as in Marxist critique, but unity, harmony and efficiency across the 
functional spheres of industrial economy. The remedy to alienation/exploitation of the 
individual is not abolition of private property, it is not workers’ selfmanagement etc. – the 
alienated individual can find social and moral refuge within a corporation, which is an 
institution intimate enough with its members to feel their needs, with their variations.167 
 
Corporatist ideology (prevalent in Kemalism, as we shall se later) is not to be confused 
with fascism. Namely, corporatism had historically two versions – solidaristic and fascistic 
version (the latter met most prominent realization in Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s 
Germany). Whereas they both share the organic vision of society – a society consisted of 
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harmoniously functioning occupational groups – they have a different understanding of the 
scope of freedom that is to be allowed to the individual. 
 
The fascistic version sees the corporations as the public organs of the state, to be used to 
control and dominate society. The state monopolizes and dominates all spheres of life and 
does not respect autonomy of any sphere. It transmits orders to the corporations, which then 
transmit them to the individuals who have no prior rights vis-à-vis the state. Individuality is 
radically negated: the state dominates the individuals to the point of eliminating their 
abstract status. On the other hand, according to the solidaristic version of corporatism, 
individuals still possess rights. These rights are limited in comparison to those of the liberal 
model: they are not supposed to exceed certain boundaries. The emphasis is still on 
submersion of private interests to the higher, public good, that is, on duties and obligations 
– to occupation and to society – rather than rights, while the state is imbuing otherwise 
egotistic individuals with public-spiritedness. But certain individualism and initiative is 
acknowledged. In solidaristic corporatism, corporations in fact perform a double function: 
they are there not only to socialize the individual and assimilate him to the state, but also to 
check and restrain the state from encroaching upon individual members’ autonomous 
domain, thus protecting them. Corporations are sort of buffers between the individual and 
the state.168 Here, the state is above all a regulatory and coordinating institution, with 
jurisdiction primarily in the intercorporational domain.169 This is also manifested in the 
way how economy is run. In the fascist variant, state and politics are supreme over the 
economy (and society), while in the solidaristic variant – although politics still have 
primacy over economy – the state assumes more a role of an arbiter between labor and 
capital and between employer and employee by frequently legislating against both strikes 
and lockouts in the interest of the public good.170 
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5.4.1. Corporatism in Kemalism 
 
 
Corporatist ideology entered late Ottoman/Turkish theoretical life with the Young Turk 
ideologue Ziya Gökalp, who found these themes relevant to theorizing politics in the 
Turkish context at the turn of the century and appropriated solidaristic corporatism of 
Emile Durkheim. His theory then underwent some changes within the ideological frame of 
Kemalists, but maintained its main aspects. Kemalism can thus be classified as a 
solidaristic corporatist ideology, as Parla and Davison have shown.171 
 
Evidence for this thesis is abundant. We noted earlier that the Kemalists of the interwar 
period saw bolshevism as incompatible with the Turkish national character and they 
inhibited development of socialist movements in Anatolia. As for their opposition to 
liberal-type individualism, in Kemalism there is no emphasis on the intrinsic worth of the 
individual. In their discourse, as long as the individual or his value for society is concerned, 
the stress is not really on the individual as such (his subjectivity, wellbeing etc.), but rather 
on his attributes that relate to his role in a larger social context – for instance, his work.172 
The following citation is indicative: 
 
   “Ataturkism has … defined their [Turks’] responsibility, which is to work. In 
Atatürk’s view, the survival of society is endangered if the individual refrains from 
work. … Social order in Turkey can be preserved and maintained by the labor of the 
individual. The following words of Atatürk clearly point to the direct relationship 
between populism and the principle of work: ‘Let us be fully aware that we are a 
people who must work for salvation and survival. We all have rights and powers, but 
we must work for our rights. Those who are idle and shun work have no place or right 
in our society’.”173 
 
A TAF officer, author of the quote above, reiterates the crucial nature of individual’s work 
– a tendency consistent with solidaristic corporatism in general. Also, it reflects a 
                                                 
171 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
172 Ibid., p. 260. 
173 Birand, Shirts of Steel, p. 62. 
  58 
characteristically corporatist understanding of relationship between rights and duties, 
according to which individuals’ duties and responsibilities come before their rights. 
 
Although Kemalism strongly emphasized solidaristic corporatism, it also partially 
incorporated fascistic characteristics here and there.174 Parla and Davison have argued that 
certain aspects, such as elements of racism, emphasis and high esteem for the nation, or the 
cult of the great leader, exceed the limits of the solidaristic corporatist ideology and are in 
fact leanings (although not full-fledged developments) toward fascism.175 To give one 
example, in Atatürk’s speeches there is very little, if none, emphasis on the autonomous 
status of the individual as such. If there had been any, his statements would not have had 
the fascistic tendencies they do. Instead, the emphasis is on ‘heroism’ of individuals, their 
devotion to the nation and their discipline. Individual selfhood is irrelevant or inadequate as 
a building block of social life, and the nation is the single superior identity for all 
inhabitants of the “fatherland”.176 
 
In this context, we should mention another conceptualization of relationship and distinction 
between the Kemalist-type corporatism/fascism and the interwar German-Italian-type 
fascism – a theory distinguishing between plebeian fascism and patrician fascism. 
 
Plebeian fascism, with its realization in regimes of Hitler and Mussolini, did not come from 
elite: it came into existance from parties that were for a long time marginal to the existing 
political system. These parties were like a “gang” that captured the power. They liked to 
address the widest possible masses, as in parades which came with a lot of frenzy. On the 
other hand, patrician fascism, e.g. Kemalism, is generated and conveyed by elite. For 
example, Atatürk read his speeches in small circles, not to the masses in public squares. 
They were afraid or unleashing autonomous mass action and they did not like to ramble 
(unlike Hitler or Mussolini; in this sense, Kemalism also fit nicely into the existing pattern 
of change from above dating back to the Ottoman Empire). 
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Within the Kemalist-type solidaristic corporatism, special status is designated to two 
social/institutional groups: the youth and the military. In simple terms, they both have 
almost identical role: to defend the nation, state and society from all threats. Atatürk’s 
views on youth were expressed in the 1935 RPP party program. It speaks about “tight 
discipline, which is the singular instrument of [national] success”, it says that [the most 
superior duty [is] to protect the homeland”, and emphasizes the development of “a clean 
and sublime love for the fatherland”.177 One cannot but notice that the youth, ideally, is 
expected to be inculcated with a spirit very close to what we have seen in the education of 
young military officers: the youth should be brought up with mentality that considers the 
protection of the homeland as its superior duty and is ready for self-sacrifice for the sake of 
that duty.178 The program also mentions other features of education that are remarkably 
close to the training in military academies, such as emphasis on physical training (“To the 
whole Turkish youth physical training shall be given. That would nourish their enthusiasm 
and health, their belief in their person and their nation”).179 
 
The military is identified as a “great school of national discipline”.180 Therefore, the 
military, with its hieratical structure, its ideological core etc. serves as a model of how the 
civilian schools should look like. For instance, Atatürk in one of his speeches presented his 
view on the role of school teachers: they “change their robes and sacrifice their heads when 
required and march with the army.” A sentence later he added: “… the Turkish youth … 
are ready in thought, in conscience and in science to participate in the national heroism 
together with the former two [the teachers and the military]”.181 
 
Thus, the bringing together of the military and the youth (they are “two armies marching 
forward”), and a lack of essential differentiation between them, ensures dissemination of 
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Kemalist ideals throughout the entire society, making people, members of the nation, “a 
military always marching along the path of national heroism”.182 This has been, of course, 
translated into governmental policies – Ayşe Gül Altınay quotes a statement of a Minister 
of National Education Nevzat Ayaz from 1994: 
 
   “In the organizational structure of our state, there are only two ministries that have 
the term ‘national’ [millî] in their titles: Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of 
National Education. The Ministry of National Defense has assumed the duty to 
protect our Republic and to defend our country from outside forces. And the Ministry 
of national Education has assumed the duty to raise citizens who are committed to 
Atatürk’s principles and revolutions, and to Atatürk nationalism as it is defined in the 
constitution.”183 
 
On one hand, this brings us back to our starting question: what is the Turkish military really 
after? It is after a corporatist society: a well-ordered, disciplined, law-abiding, obedient, 
ship-shaped, solidaristic and homogenous society, united under Ataturkism, with as little 
deviations and ideological and cultural pluralism as possible. 
 
On the other hand, this opens another question: how is it possible that the Turkish Armed 
Forces insist and publicly declare that what they are after is democracy, and not something 
else (e.g. corporatism) – despite an obvious discrepancy between their idea of democracy 
and Western ideas of democracy, or despite the fact that the ideology of Kemalism bears a 
number of fascist elements etc.? 
 
One reason may be that at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, when 
democracy has become the highest, unchallenged political ideal, it is almost impossible for 
one to officially claim to be against democratic principles. Besides, Turkey has also had 
strategic and political interests in being part of the Western Block after the World War II 
and especially during the Cold – an alliance that ensured protection from territorial threats 
coming from the Soviet Union, and necessitated adopting some of the basic political 
institutions of the West, including parliamentary democracy. 
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Secondly, despite of essential differences between liberalism, socialism and corporatism, 
solidaristic corporatist ideology as such has been historically very closely tied to the two 
other ideologies – at least on a discursive level. This is because various corporatist regimes 
have had to justify themselves either in liberal-democratic or socialist terms for the past 
fifty years, on the one hand, and because of discernable absence of a corporatist 
vocabulary, on the other:184 
 
   “It is not always the case that one finds an explicit rationale for corporatist 
capitalism in contexts where it is practiced, especially in western Europe today. 
Policy indicators may be observed, but no official corporatist ideological expression 
need accompany them. … In the Western ideological sphere, where liberal doctrine 
enjoys a moral authority, corporatists publicly conform to liberal rhetoric while 
concealing their policy and institutional initiatives that slight, rather than respect, the 
inviolable integrity of individuality (as, for example, liberal theory posits). 
Corporatism, then, … may remain as a loose worldview that needs to be analyzed in 
places other than official statements.”185 
 
If this applies to corporatist elements within Western Europe, it applies at least equally, if 
not more for corporatism of Turkey, due to Turkey’s well-known age-old aspiration to – at 
least superficially – adjust itself to the Western regimes and to be accepted by the ‘Western 
club’ as one of its own. 
 
Thirdly, we can nonetheless not ignore the various liberalization reforms that the one-party 
Kemalist regime undertook, such as increased rights for women, or secularism. One also 
has to admit that democracy and other liberal institutions have been a social reality in 
Turkey, not just sheer corporatism covered only with liberal rhetoric – no matter how non-
Western or peculiar to Turkey they may have been.186 Yet, Parla and Davison argue that the 
reforms that amounted to a lessening of the patriarchal chains were only partly liberalizing. 
                                                 
184 Parla and Davison, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey, p. 31. 
185 Ibid. 
186 By “non-Western and peculiar to Turkey” we allude to various criticisms that 
Turkish democracy has borne, from the military takeovers and the violations of human 
rights, to the traditional preference of in-groups and disregard for the opposition. 
  62 
As the main ideological emphasis in Kemalism is solidaristic and cooperative, not 
individualist and participatory, the partial liberalization may have been an outcome of the 
reforms, rather than their primary intent.187 For instance, although Kemalism instituted 
laicism, it also offered and controlled its own interpretation of Islam, as opposed to liberal 
concern to disestablish religion in order to ensure freedom in religious belief. Although the 
cultural reforms and the new civil code increased rights for women, thus seem to be a move 
against patriarchal relations and arbitrary male activity, it is difficult to discern any explicit 
interest on Atatürk’s part in attacking relations of authority typical of patriarchy. Namely, 
the one-party regime also issued sartorial requirements for men in all social spheres and for 
women in state and public institutions. The stress was on harmonious relations between the 
occupational groups of the solidaristic whole, as opposed to securing liberty for everyone 
and promoting individual development and political participation as we know it in 
liberalism.188 
 
However, these partial and accidental reforms, liberal islands in a corporatist sea, have been 
enough for the Turkish political, military etc. elite to claim its affiliation to the prevailingly 
liberal-democratic West. Even in the West, Kemalism has been overall appreciated as a 
progressive westernizing movement with an aim to join the ranks of contemporary 
civilization. The West, however, has largely failed to discern Kemalism’s corporatist 
commitments. Kemalism has indeed participated in some progressive tendencies of the 
modern age (of the West), but this participation should be defined more specifically: “if the 
West was the benchmark, then it was the nationalist-corporatist-laicist West in which 
Kemalism participated, not the democratizing West”.189 Kemalist principle of populism – a 
concept within the corpus of Kemalist principles that is the closest to the concept of 
democracy, and most often identified with it – was a form of nationalist, laicist, solidaristic 
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corporatism, not of liberal or radical democracy: “Goals of freedom, equality, even justice, 
simply put, were not and are not the explicit emphases of kemalist ideology.”190 
 
 
 
5.4.2. Propensity to Intervene With a Coup 
 
 
Now, taking all the above-mentioned components of officers’ education together – that is, 
isolation from civilian world and a feeling of superiority, unconditional adherence to 
Ataturkism with a feeling of duty to safeguard the ideology, and a peculiar image of what 
civilian politics ought to be – by “putting pieces into the puzzle”, what we get is an 
explosive barrel: a high potentiality and inclination towards a political intervention. 
Consider, for instance, a high-ranking officer’s interpretation of the Kemalist principle of 
revolutionism: 
 
   “Atatürk envisaged a swift rather than a gradual renewal. If I have sufficient power 
and authority, I think I will bring about the revolution desired in our society by means 
of a “coup”. … Having spent so many years of my life educating myself, studying 
civilized society, and enjoying freedom, why should I stoop to the level of the people 
instead of raising them to my level? They should be like me, not I like them!”191 
 
Moreover, it is easy to find the germ of later military interventions already in the RPP 
ideology of the 1930s. Namely, as far as, on the on hand, the military and the education 
system are fused in the Kemalist corporatist state (as we saw earlier), on the other hand we 
have a well known Atatürk’s principle of separation between politics and military (Atatürk 
himself was an officer turned politician). Counter to common interpretations according to 
which this principle implies an absence of political relation between military and politics, 
that is to say, noninvolvement of the military in politics or subordination of the military 
structures to the government, another interpretation posits that the military is in fact not 
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separate from politics but positioned over politics (which also better explains all the three 
military interventions in Turkish politics).192 The military was supposed to take up the role 
designated to Atatürk, probably after he dies: a role of “looking over the Kemalist state (as 
Atatürk did) and preserving it as its highest guardian”.193 
 
Numerous points in Atatürk’s speeches show that he does not diminish the role of the 
military in politics as much as he elevates it to this new, special position. The army was 
supposed to be a necessary tool for achieving solidaristic and corporatist aims, a tool of 
social transformation and tranquility, unity and order. 194 In this context, a military 
intervention is not only possible, but almost expected: 
 
   “Like the leader of unparalleled and unquestionable judgment, the military need not 
consistently involve itself with the ebb and flow of everyday political life because it 
effectively oversees the entire context of governance. … Although Kemalism may 
conceptualize the military as remaining out of ordinary politics, it does not suggest 
that the military must remain outside the governing administration of the state. In 
Kemalist terms, therefore, it would be unusual were the military not to involve itself 
on occasion in governance.”195 
 
This explains why from 1950 up until today the military has not been a merely passive 
sideliner but has had its own intergovernmental contacts, and issued judgments related to 
political currents through media, let alone the three interventions. The military, alongside 
with the Republic’s children, is the embodiments and the expression of the great nation. 
Atatürk virtually gave the military full symbolic and representative powers, he collapsed 
the nation and the military and declared the military to be the true owner (not only 
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guardian) of the country. Parla and Davison conclude that “this is the foundation for the 
whole ideology behind the history of coups d’état in Turkey”.196 
 
Thus the relations between the TAF and the civilian government can be described as a 
system in which civilian authority is primary rather than supreme.197 As long as the civilian 
government functions within the parameters defined by the Turkish constitution, the 
military is content and remains within its specific sphere, the defense (where it is in fact 
autonomous). But if it considers that the civilian government is failing to safeguard against 
threats to the country, or to the regime, than it believes that is has a legal and moral 
obligation to intervene. For the vast majority of the Turkish officer corps, failure to take 
such action would be a violation of an almost sacred duty, even a denial of their raison 
d’être.198  
 
The officers deeply internalize this understanding, starting from their cadet years. Although 
the military schools and academies never explicitly say to their students that they will have 
to intervene if necessary, the lesson they univocally draw is that the army has a duty 
regarding the political life of the country. As a matter of fact, not only they learn this in 
school – we can say that support for military interventions in case of a need is present in a 
significant section of the Turkish civilian population. A cadet from the 1980s quotes his 
father who used to say: “Thank God for the army. We can rely on it to save us.”199 He adds 
that he grew up with this attitude. 
 
What cadets find out in schools is therefore more a sort of a line which the military should 
protect, that is to say, what are the specific conditions under which the military can and 
should either directly intervene or at least indirectly influence politics. This line goes along 
the principles of Atatürk. The military will react when they are violated, for example, with 
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the threat of political Islam, communism, or ethnic separatism, briefly, by any internal and 
external enemies: 
 
   “In order for the Turkish nation and her Armed Forces to be successful, they must 
know who their enemies are. There are two forces that prevent Turkey from attaining 
the Dynamic Ideal. One consists of external threats with colonial intentions who 
would not like to see us making progress. But … an even more harmful and 
destructive group consists of traitors who are likely to rise from within us.”200 
 
The quote above from a textbook compiled for the General Staff then reiterates the known 
superiority attitude of the officer staff: 
 
   “Such enemies cannot be sensible and patriotic people who are aware of the 
realities, but those who are stupid and ignorant, or evil and unpatriotic, or blind.”201 
 
Therefore, the Turkish coups d’état in the second half of 20th do not seem odd at all. The 
act of coup d’état fits perfectly into the ideological outlook of the military and it can be 
deduced from Atatürk’s principles and speeches. It is inherent in the curriculum of the 
military academies. Seeing things from this perspective, we should actually turn the 
question around: not ‘Why did the military intervene?’, but ‘Why did it restore democracy 
(relatively) soon after every intervention?’ How come that the military has time and again 
decided to step down and return to the barracks, retreat from direct political involvement 
(what is more, it made a promise to do so at every single intervention and fulfilled its 
promise), instead of, say, keeping the grip over society at all time time, thus ensuring that 
society runs the way they want? 
 
One reason, obviously, is that the ideology of coup d’état, emanating from Ataturkism, is 
counterposed by another crucial component of the military’s ideology and world outlook, 
mentioned earlier – detest for participation in day-to-day politics, politics that is inevitably 
‘dirty’ and ‘corrupting’. It seems that a time-limited intervention, a short operation to 
‘correct the anomalies in the society and tune it back to the desired when it has gone off the 
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right path’ is a perfect middle way, an ideal solution to the contradiction inherent in the 
military’s ideology itself. 
 
Another reason is that, although the democratic ideal as such is not immanent to the 
corporatist ideology, it has nevertheless been an important developmental goal for the 
Turkish military and Turkish society in general, for it has been a criterion to consider a 
country as part of the “West”. Therefore it has been a sine-qua-non of the Ottoman/Turkish 
project of ‘bringing the country to the level of contemporary civilization’ (an important 
feature of Ataturkism and a phrase often heard in the speeches of commanders). 
 
There also seems to be a third reason, something that also makes the Turkish military 
special in the Middle Eastern context, or even globally: all the Turkey’s military 
interventions have been driven purely ideologically, without considerations for material 
self-interest of the military establishment. 
 
Steven A. Cook in his comparative analysis of relationship between the military and 
politics in three countries, Turkey, Egypt and Algeria, finds that in these countries the 
military establishment was a progressive force of modernization and democratization; it 
was an instrument to direct the processes of industrialization, institutionalization, and 
reform necessary for the development of a modern society. The military was an institution 
that had an organizational capacity, sense of mission, as well as a national sentiment. 
However, once the goals of modernization, industrialization etc. were met, the military did 
not relinquish its prestigious position and the officers became conservative elements 
clinging tenaciously to regimes that they more or less created.  Cook calls these officers, 
which are mostly of senior rank, the “military enclave”: 
 
   “The officers of the military enclave, along with their civilian allies, strategically 
created political systems that have benefited themselves at the expense of the rest of 
society. … Over time, the officers sought to conceal themselves behind the veneer of 
democratic institutions, representative structures, and legitimizing institutions that 
came to characterize their respective political systems. During periods of crisis, 
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however, the military elite tend to strip away this facade, revealing themselves as the 
locus of power and reinforcing the authoritarian core of the political order.”202 
 
The facades remain “precisely little more than the pretenses of democracy they 
represent”.203 These countries, however, are not to be confused with military dictatorships: 
rather, they are “military-dominated states”. The democratic facades “permit the 
commanders to rule but they leave it to others to govern”.204 
 
We know this story from the Turkish case. However, there is a crucial difference between 
the regimes in Algeria and Egypt, on one hand, and Turkey on the other, in terms of what 
motivates the military to meddle with politics (either directly, with a coup, or exerting 
influence through some other institutions). Cook postulates that the military – in any given 
country – possesses different types of interests: core interests and existential interests.205 
Existential interests are basically the military’s concern for the regime. When the officers 
perceive a threat to the political order, the military will almost certainly respond. Core 
interests, on the other hand, include economic interests, security and foreign policy, and the 
political and state apparatus; military’s reaction, if these interests are jeopardized, can 
occur, but it is not as likely as in the case of an attack on existential interests. 206 
 
This distinction applies to the armies in all three countries. However, not all of them are 
equally concerned for core interests. Let us take economic interests as an example. In 
Egypt, officers have parlayed predominant positions within the Egyptian state to enhance 
their personal wealth. After Anwar Sadat’s coming to power in 1970, a nexus between 
economic interests and the military developed. President’s economic policy allowed the 
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members of the military enclave and the economic elite to benefit mutually from the 
“commissions game”, which enriched the officers and ensured that, in return, contracts 
from the military continued to flow. Later on, the military as a whole became perhaps 
Egypt’ single most important economic entity due to their portfolio in manufacture of 
weapons, services in security sectors, even various agribusiness, services in tourism and 
infrastructure development.207 
 
In Algeria, too, the officer corps has particular economic interests that it has protected at 
the expense of Algerian society. Partial liberalization of the economy in the 1980s provided 
an opportunity for members of the military establishment to benefit from new sources of 
rent. When previously public assets were privatized, the new members were often military 
officers or their civilian allies. Later, in the 1990s, the senior commanders opposed 
recommendations of the IMF to establish greater economic transparency, while 
simultaneously seeking to leverage economic reforms to their own benefit. Overall, while 
rents circulated through the military, public sector and commercial private sector, the 
general population was forced to contend with limited economic opportunities. 208 
 
Like in Algeria or Egypt, the Turkish military enclave represents a population with 
distinctive worldview and a sense of superiority, an elite that is also physically separated 
from society in facilities exclusively for the military use, such as schools, hospitals, clubs, 
and residential areas.209 It is also true that the TGS has had an interest in certain companies 
and sectors of economy; for example, it has historically had autonomy in the realm of 
weapons procurement, where it has been directed contracts towards a number of favored 
domestic and foreign firms.210 Further, when the officers retire they receive a lump sum 
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which is usually sufficient to pay an apartment, and they receive a pension in addition. 
Officers, as well as their spouses, receive a free medical care until their death.211 That is 
why many families of the lower-middle class find military career attractive for their child. 
They know that if their child enters a military school, everything would be free, lodging 
and clothing, even the textbooks, on top of which their child would receive some pocket 
money. Parents also know that if their son makes enough effort and finishes military 
academy, he will be receiving a regular income for life and his future will be certain. 
Although he will not earn much, he will have enough to meet his basic needs.212  
 
Nevertheless, economically speaking, it is the middle class that the military officers in 
Turkey belong to. Turkish officers are not rich people, and their salaries are not very 
generous: they are slightly higher than those in the civilian service but considerably lower 
than those in the private sector. Furthermore, the instances in which Turkish officers have 
engaged in corruption or used their status to extract rents from state-owned or private 
enterprises are relatively few. Therefore it seems that the military enclave in Turkey has 
been the least concerned with economic gains and privileges: its economic interests are 
different in both degree and kind from those of their Egyptian and Algerian counterparts.213 
 
That is the capital distinction between the military in Turkey and militaries in Egypt and 
Algeria, or, possibly, between the Turkish military and militaries in other parts of the world 
that have seen military dictatorships. Turkish officer staff, we claim, is principally 
concerned with the defense of the Kemalist ideology, while their private economic 
considerations run secondary or do not even count at all. Indeed, soldiering in Turkey is not 
a profession leading to a brilliant material future; rather, its moral aspects are emphasized 
in the academies. The following quote by a commander’s speech expresses that well: 
 
   “Lads, you are dedicated to a duty that is too important to be measured in material 
terms. There is not enough money in the world to buy one’s way into the realm you 
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have entered. You all know that money cannot buy happiness. … you are dedicated to 
our glorious banner and the motherland, expecting nothing in return.”214 
 
The Turkish military has not had a reason to cling on to power in order to ensure its 
economic well-being – a fact that has made it more likely for it to step down from power 
once the social order it favors is restored. 
 
 
 
5.5. 1960 and 1971 Military Interventions 
 
 
In the background of all the three military interventions in the history of Turkey the 
motives of the military were similar: wish to protect the country from threats, maintain 
corporatist order etc. (concerns described above). We can consider this as the common 
denominator of all the three interventions. Yet, each of them had certain specificities of 
their own. The coups did not differ only because they all happened at different times and in 
different circumstances (the political parties and ideologies that the military was faced with 
were not the same) – there are more essential distinctions between them, mainly in terms of 
the military’s strategy applied each time, and partly also the military’s motives in a 
narrower sense. 
 
The 27 May 1960 coup was caused by the tensions between the military establishment and 
the ruling Democrat Party. The Democrat Party (DP) came to power in the second 
democratic elections of 1950 (and according to many records, the first truly free and 
regular elections). That was the first time when an opposition party formed the government, 
after 27 years of rule of the Republican People’s Party. The DP, that was not allowed to 
challenge any Kemalist tenets of republicanism and secularism when it was established in 
1945, formulated its distinctive program largely in the economic field. It offered economic 
incentives, such as credit, subsidies, road building programs etc., and allowed for more 
economic freedom, as opposed to the statist tradition of the RPP. In terms of popular 
support, the DP was a coalition of social groups in small towns and rural farmers and 
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landlords. In other words, it represented the provincial elements of the country (although, in 
time, increasingly also inhabitants of the cities) that were overall more religious and felt a 
stronger sense of continuity with the pre-Republican period than the urban bureaucratic 
class that had undergone an ideological and cultural transformation and modernization.215 
 
Although most of its staff, including its president Adnan Menderes, were politically 
socialized in the RPP from which they separated in 1945, hostility between the two parties 
grew increasingly during the 1950s. Moreover, the DP as such, and Adnan Menderes in 
particular had an ambiguous attitude towards the military which remained ideologically 
closer to the RPP (e.g. the RPP kept the six arrows of Kemalism in its program). Menderes 
was aware and appreciative of the military’s historical role as the defender of the state. 
However, he also regarded the military as a guarantor of a highly centralized system since 
the founding of the Republic, a system that was unfriendly to landed notables and other 
groups that favored a degree of administrative decentralization. In addition, he felt that the 
military was a non-productive group that demanded a share of the national income 
illegitimately large.216 
 
Therefore Menderes tried to downgrade the role of the military and the bureaucracy by 
carrying out an extensive purge of the officer corps in an effort to weed out sympathizers of 
the RPP. At the same time, he was increasing the power and influence of the 
entrepreneurial groups, businessmen and countryside merchants-landowners. This policy 
led to a diminishing prestige and influence of the military-civilian bureaucracy.217 The RPP 
saw this policy as unacceptable and a threat to the legacy of Atatürk. They challenged the 
DP forcefully with mass demonstrations and political speeches. Menderes threatened to 
close down the RPP, and the RPP president, Đsmet Đnönü, replied by calling for the 
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intervention of the military to “save democracy”, or rather the RPP, from the DP 
leadership.218 
 
During their decade in power, the Democrats also tended to ignore the views of the military 
leadership. This was an irritation all the bigger since members of the TAF were not eligible 
to vote.219 In addition, although the Democrats’ ties with the military were weaker than 
those between the military and the RPP, the DP used the army against some of the 
demonstrations organized by the RPP. This created additional vexation among the officer 
staff. Especially among certain small sections of the military, or better to say secret 
associations, anti-DP activities acquired an aura of heroism and patriotism.220 Eventually, 
as political contest and squabbling became extremely embittered, the idea of the 
intervention gained legitimacy within the officer corps.221 
 
The military took over on 27 May 1960, under the leadership of General Cemal Gürsel. 
They removed president Celâl Bayar and prime minister Menderes. Menderes was later 
executed together with two former ministers from the DP. In October 1961 the military 
returned the power to civilians. More precisely, partial return of power to civilians already 
occurred in 1960: since the military felt a great hostility towards the ruling party, and a 
bond of sympathy with the opposition RPP, there was actually not a full junta installed in 
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power, except for a short period of time. By the fall of 1960 the government was virtually 
in the hands of RPP, but with military personnel in a number of important positions.222 
 
Constituent Assembly was convened in late 1960. All former members of the DP, even its 
voters, were excluded by law from becoming members of the Constituent Assembly. 
Therefore the Constitution of 1961 was almost exclusively the work of the RPP (though the 
RPP itself had different fractions).223 However, it should not be considered as an 
authoritarian constitution, for the main goal of the military was to dilute government 
authority. The constitution introduced a system of checks and balances that would prove to 
be effective in diffusing government power.224 It openly recognized the existence of some 
social groups, such as labor, and acknowledged workers’ right to organize themselves 
politically.225 The following two decades will probably be a period of the largest socio-
political pluralism in the post-Second World War Turkey.226 
 
At the same time, there were several institutional changes aimed at securing interest and 
influence of the armed forces in politics. For instance, the military with cooperation of the 
RPP politicians provided that the members of the armed forces would have the vote. 
Further and more importantly, they created the National Security Council (established with 
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the 1961 Constitution) as a legal mechanism to assure a voice for the military profession. It 
was a body that guaranteed the continued involvement of at least the top ranks of the 
military establishment in the political affairs in general and security matters in particular. 
Another aspect of the military’s weight in politics was a precedent – which would be 
continued in later decades – that presidency was a position reserved for a senior officer 
(accordingly, General Gürsel was elected president in 1961).227 
 
There are several differences between the 1960, precedent military takeover, and the later 
two takeovers. The 1960 takeover was in essence a colonels’ coup. Colonels, i.e. middle-
rank officers were the main plotters against the government, while the rest of the officer 
corps accepted the action because of a widespread fear that the state was in danger from a 
breakdown of the constitutional process.228 
 
This anomaly in the chain of command had two important consequences. One was that 
there were new attempts of military moves in the few years after 1960. Following the 
elections in 1961, when the RPP formed a coalition government with the Justice Party 
(descendent of the Democrat party), some officers resumed plotting. They were vexed by 
the continuing agitation by the Justice Party for an amnesty for the members of the old 
regime, and attempted to take over in 1962 and once more 1963. After both of the attempts 
had failed, politicization of the middle and lower rank officers more or less ended. This 
experience, together with the fact that the standard chain of command was infringed, left 
the commanders with a concern to keep subordinates out of political roles and to confine 
dealings with politicians to the top-ranking generals.229 Another consequence was that the 
military rulers in 1960 had to conduct a much deeper purge of the officer corps than in later 
military moves. There were massive retirements of senior officers in 1960 (around 90% of 
the generals and about 40% of the colonels and majors). Compared to this, the moves of 
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military leaders in later takeovers were minor – in fact, by 1980 no need was perceived to 
clean out party partisans from the military corps.230 
 
After 1962, the intensity of military involvement in politics decreased gradually, but 
reappeared towards the end of 1960s when Turkey experienced a growing violence 
between left-wing and right-wing students on university campuses. Especially after 1968, 
clashes became murderous, bank-robberies to raise money for extremist political activities 
occurred and there were kidnappings of members of the American military stationed in 
Turkey. In 1971, the military intervention was primarily aimed at restoring peace and order 
within the civil society, thus it curtailed some of the freedoms granted by the 1961 
constitution (an instance that would be even more emphasized in the 1980 coup).231 
 
On 12 March 1971 military members of the National Security Council issues a demand (a 
memorandum) to the government of the prime minister Süleyman Demirel to be more 
decisive or to step down. This ultimatum was not a full military intervention into the 
political arena. They acted more behind the scenes and dictated the politicians what to do. 
For instance, Demirel’s party retained its majority in parliament. However, Demirel 
resigned and non-party cabinets ruled the country until the 1973 elections, together with the 
NSC.232 In this sense, the 1960 and 1971 takeovers were both different from the 1980 
takeover: in both cases, the military either co-ruled with the civilians or directed them 
behind the scenes, whereas in the 1980-83 period the military was more alienated from all 
the political groupings and acted as an independent force, virtually exclusively with the 
commanders – more precisely, the NSC purged of civilian members – ruling with a heavy 
hand. 
 
In 1971, the new authorities launched a broad wave of arrests of suspects, closed the 
Turkish Labor Party (a communist party) and shut down leftist publications. This was the 
first time that the organs of repression used massive systematic torture in detention and 
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interrogation centers. Violations of human rights became publicly known through the press 
thanks to prisoners who wrote secret notes which they managed to convey out of the prison. 
 
The government enacted a constitutional amendment by which they strengthened the 
powers of the government against threats to national unity, public order and security. They 
also increased the autonomy and influence of the military establishment, for instance, by 
defining the statements of the NSC not merely as “views” but as “recommendations” to the 
government. However, increased authorities given to the military in securing law and order 
aside, the commanders did not make a drastic change in the overall position of the military 
in society, nor was there any thought yet that partisan competition might destabilize society 
and render the government unable to effectively rule the country.233 We can say that in 
1971 the military performed certain corrections, fine tunings of the system, by making the 
government a little more effective and powerful; these moves were carried out much more 
extensively and radically in 1980. 
 
 
 
5.6. Military and Politics in the Late 1970s 
 
 
The military had deteriorating conditions during the 1970s. US arms embargo following the 
1974 Cyprus intervention, together with domestic economic trouble deeply hurt the 
military. They were in need for modernization. Officers were chronically underpaid, 
frustrated and open targets for political influence; an American report said that almost all 
major items, tanks, ships, aircraft, communications and support equipment, were 
obsolete.234 
 
The relations between the military elite and political establishment were becoming 
particularly tense in the last few years of the decade. The military was dissatisfied with 
Ecevit’s government, particularly with its soft approach on Kurdish question – a 
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traditionally sensitive issue for the military. They regarded the Kurdish movement as a 
threat to split Turkey and any compromise was considered as aiding assaults on the national 
integrity of Turkey. By contrast, for the RPP and Ecevit the problem could be better 
handled by solving some of the region’s cultural and economic problems, while the 
disciplining, “law and order” approach could be resorted to only when necessary. There 
were certain incidents that fueled military’s impatience, such as slogans “Freedom for the 
Kurds!” in eastern Turkey (in Kurdish language); same slogan appeared on the May Day 
1978 rallies in Istanbul. Furthermore, some RPP members were speaking Kurdish in the 
National Assembly cafeterias. The armed forces directly blamed Ecevit and his soft-line 
approach for what was perceived as growing secessionism.235 
 
Ecevit also stepped on army’s toes by questioning its position in the Turkish polity and its 
internal organization. In February 1978 he came up with a new concept of national security, 
inspired by his trip to Yugoslavia (a model of defense force based on partisan experience 
and rapid civilian mobilization). Right-wing press reported that Ecevit is importing socialist 
models and humiliating the military establishment.236 Further, he raised the question of the 
Counter-Guerilla group that was set up in 1959: civilians were given arms by the High 
Command (military) to combat a potential communist infiltration into Turkey from the 
Middle East (similar to Gladio in Europe against the USSR). Ecevit believed that such an 
extra-legal organization had no place under the rule of law (he already attacked this 
paramilitary organization during his previous period in office in 1974; now, he insisted that 
the High Command does something about it). This in itself was a sensitive matter for the 
military, and as the debates were raised, the relationship between Ecevit and the military, 
convinced that he made a deliberate attempt to discredit the military, worsened even 
further.237 
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A serious internal problem of the military establishment was the fact that political 
polarization of society began to seep into the armed forces as well, mostly among the lower 
ranked military personnel. One instance of this process was the escape of Mehmet Ali Ağca 
from his cell in a military prison, a right-wing terrorist who had been sentenced to death for 
assassinating Abdi Đpekçi. Forty one military personnel of the prison were apprehended and 
charged with aiding the escape of Ağca.238 In the longer term, infiltration and polarization 
of the armed forces could result in a fractionalization of the military and could ultimately 
end up in a civil war. 
 
During this time there was already discussion of a military coup among the officer corps. In 
1979, however, they moved from discussing the possibility of an intervention in private 
gatherings to an open discussion – which was still internal and subject to military secrecy – 
of its necessity. From the second half of 1979 the question was no longer whether to 
intervene or not – it was simply “when and how to intervene”. In the first few months of 
1979 the chief of staff increased his tours of inspection and meetings with local 
commanders. To a careful observer, this could be more than a clue that something 
extraordinary was going on in the military.239 In August 1979 the commanders set the 
wheels in motion in a characteristically military fashion: first they wanted to define the 
problem precisely, before searching for possible solutions. Series of seminars and briefings 
were held, hosting experts and officials whom the officers were asking questions about 
problems in municipalities, among other things, and taking notes.240 
 
Discussions of the timing and tactics of the coup were carefully confined to the top-ranking 
personnel, more precisely, a group called the Special Planning Group. Main architects of 
the takeover were chief of staff Kenan Evren and his deputy, general Haydar Saltık (he was 
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also Evren’s executive arm, looking after planning and execution of the decisions). Other 
services’ chiefs played more of a consultative role: these were commander of the navy 
Bülent Ulusu, commander of the land forces Nurettin Ersin, and the air force commander 
Tahsin Şahinkaya. Evren was opened to suggestions and discussion prior to his final 
decision – however, this decision rested upon him and the others dutifully executed his 
directives. In this process Evren even broadened the range of his consultations, for instance, 
the commander of the First Army and Istanbul under martial law general Mustafa Necdet 
Üruğ emerged as an important cosultant.241 
 
There was controversy within the officer corps as to the question of how to carry out the 
coup. Two different strategies were on the table: 
 
a) Mediated approach (“doves”): putting pressure on Prime Minister Demirel through the 
NSC (Demirel hardly said no to any of the army’s demands). 
 
b) “Hard-line approach” (“hawks”, no half-way measures). Construction of a new Turkey 
which would withstand the ravages of civilian politicians; otherwise, the army would have 
to keep intervening every time things went wrong, like in previous coups.242 
 
Among the two groups there was unanimity on the fact they would have to cope with 
terror. Birand quotes a statement from a discussion of the decision-making group: “Human 
rights, democracy, all that … hang ten of the terrorists in public and I promise you the 
whole thing will stop.”243 
 
A substantial section of the commanders supported the mediated approach. The hardliners, 
on the other hand, pointed to the failures of 27 May 1960 that brought a constitution 
granting too much freedom to the civil society and allowing unrest, and 12 March 1971 
memorandum that had already curtailed the liberties implied in the 1961 constitution, yet it 
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could not prevent deeper sinking into crisis and violence.244 The arguments of the latter 
group were convincing; they also seemed to be proved by reality, since the influence 
exerted through the NSC, for instance, proved to be of no significant help in trying to settle 
disagreements between Demirel and Ecevit. 
 
By the end of 1979 the military was in the midst of preparations for a takeover. Yet they 
decided to hold back a little longer. A takeover at this stage would be ill-timed, especially 
because of the Western sensitivities over electoral processes. Namely, there were by-
lections in October that year and the new government under Demirel had just taken office 
the month before. That is why they could not depose it without giving it at least the last 
chance to deal with the crisis. Kenan Evren had a reputation of being a cautious person, and 
at a December meeting of the planning group his suggestion to wait a little longer with a 
coup so that the takeover would be perceived as a last resort was well met. It was obvious 
that the military wanted the coup to be perfectly justified and vindicated.245 
 
Instead, they decided for a letter of warning that was presented to president Korutürk on 27 
December 1979. The letter expressed military’s dissatisfaction with the situation in the 
country: danger to national unity, protection of person and property; people are singing the 
Communist International instead of Turkish National Anthem, agitating for an Islamic state 
etc.246 The politicians were not sure how to interpret this text and evaluate army’s 
intentions. They were relieved to see that this was not like the 12 March 1971 ultimatum. 
Ecevit stated that this would not lead to a military intervention; it is just an expression of 
army’s frustration and a reminder for all constitutional institutions, political parties and the 
parliament to assume their responsibilities. Demirel said that they just took over the 
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government and cannot be held responsible for the current problems, and continued 
refusing dialogue with the opposition.247 
 
Why did nobody anticipate a military takeover? Demirel, for example, was in power to 
purge the entire High Command before September 1980. Later, after the 1980 coup, he said 
that he truly did not understand the letter of warning as an announcement of a takeover – he 
believed that the letter was delivered to aid the government in its fight against terror. He 
added that he did not receive any inkling from the army about their intentions to seize the 
power either.248 As late as July 1980, Ecevit also believed that “the possibility of a military 
intervention is almost negligible. … The military accumulated certain experiences. They 
are intelligent enough to realize by now that military interventions don’t work. We can’t 
expect the armed forces to solve the crisis.”249 
 
The army finished preparing the plan of the takeover around May 1980.250 The operation 
was called “Operation Flag” (symbolic: to unite the nation under the Turkish flag). 
Measures were prepared such as takeover of broadcasting facilities, control of the 
parliament, controls over the banking system and lists of suspects to be rounded up. The 
plan was contained in 15 pages; however, no provisions were made for the “morning after”, 
that is, on how to reorganize the country socio-politically and economically. At that point, 
they were certain only of a few steps (we can say that the post-1980 Turkey is in fact a 
compilation of these few points in an elaborated form): constitution would have to be 
amended and Turkey would have to be re-built under the guidance of Atatürk’s principles; 
every single aspect of the nation, state and society would have to be reconstructed; law and 
order measures would be passed (the military was particularly afraid and prepared for 
massive retaliation by civilian terrorists and a possibility of a civil war, especially in the 
shanty-town districts that had become “no go areas”); the civil service and the security 
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forces should be purged of the party militants; elections for a new parliament would follow 
soon after this cleansing operation.251 
 
By the summer of 1980 the JP government began to totter. Ecevit realized that he would 
not be able to achieve anything with Demirel. He decided to try to form a coalition with the 
NSP (Erbakan) that would topple the JP government. Operation Flag was put into motion 
on 17 June: it was set by the command for 11 July 1980. However, on 2 July, the JP got 
vote of confidence in the assembly (namely, the NSP withdrew from an agreement with 
Ecevit to overthrow the government; therefore the JP maintained its support from the right-
wing parties). Operation Flag was aborted and postponed.252 
 
 
 
6. 12 September Takeover 
 
 
 
On 9 August, the army set the date of intervention for 12 September. The months of the 
summer of 1980, last few months before the takeover were passing by with terror drifting 
deeper, and an almost paralyzed economy; the country seemed to be on the verge of chaos. 
Many had a feeling that something in the military was afoot, and that something was going 
to break. We will give a brief overview of the most significant events during the last weeks 
of the Second Turkish Republic that illustrate the perplexity of the situation. 
 
An interesting event that metaphorically foresaw the 12 September coup happened in the 
summer 1980 in Nevşehir, a town near Ankara. Nevşehir district chairman of RPP, Feyzi 
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Alaoğlu, had been assassinated by right-wing para-militaries. On 18 June 1980, a top RPP 
delegation attended the funeral. On their way from the deceased’s house to the local 
mosque they were attacked with a hail of stones coming from the side-streets, followed by 
a spray of bullets. They abandoned the coffin and sought refuge in the adjoining houses. 
Ecevit rushed to the Nevşehir prefecture. He called the chief of staff from there and 
informed him that their lives were in danger. Evren dispatched a unit to rescue them. The 
irony was that even Ecevit had to call the army to protect him and his supporters. 253  
 
On the celebration of the Victory Day on 30 August, Kenan Evren gave quite a militaristic 
speech: 
 
   “The traitors who are the instigators of anarchy … will soon get their just deserts. 
… As in the case of some others encountered in our history who dared to raise their 
ugly heads, they will be crushed under the fist of the Turkish armed forces…, and the 
exalted Turkish nation will celebrate Victory Day for ever in affluence and happiness 
within the security created by the armed forces …”254 
 
On Erbakan’s speech in Konya on 6 September, on the occasion of Israel’s decision to 
declare Jerusalem as its new capital city, the crowd obstructed the playing of the Turkish 
National Anthem and demanded recitation of passages from Koran.255 
 
On the same day, Ecevit gave a speech at the conference of petrol workers union in 
Istanbul. It seems that he felt that something was about to breach: 
 
   “It is as if a big soccer match is on. On the field we see the political parties and the 
politicians. The rest of Turkey is watching from the stands. The game being slogged 
out in the field is unsavory, vicious and exasperating. Fed up with this spectacle, 
some of the spectators have started losing patience and getting angry with their own 
side. … I’m afraid that in the end somebody will blow the whistle and say ‘The game 
is finished, everyone go home’ and call an end to a democracy which is 
indistinguishable from a meaningless game”.256 
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There were jokes among people about the political situation: “Question: Ecevit, Türkeş and 
Demirel are in a small boat out at sea. The wind picks up, there is a storm. If the boat 
capsizes, who do you think will be saved? Answer: The Turkish nation.”257 
 
Finally, in perceptions of the public and politicians, there was a certain relaxation of 
Martial Law; martial law commanders’ went on with their duties but their hearts were not 
in the job. They were complaining about their soldiers being in the firing line and being 
labeled Demirel supporters.258 
 
In the evening of 11 September, the government was cut off from its mechanisms of control 
and channels of intelligence and information (this manifested the tenuous relations between 
the state and the government in the field of security services). On 12 September at 4:00 AM 
the takeover began. Troops were sent to the streets, TV and radio were taken over, Evren 
gave a speech on TRT, and an army march was broadcasted on the radio. People close to 
Ecevit and Demirel were ordered by the military to announce their party leaders the news 
of the takeover and the leaders were then taken to custody in the company of their wives.259 
 
Public reaction was a rather positive one. People were relieved and they embraced Evren 
and the army as their liberators (some even began comparing Evren with Atatürk).260 On 13 
September, The Times newspaper (London) reported: “The curfew was lifted in the 
afternoon and people emerged in large numbers, crowding cafés, bars and parks and 
basking in the sun. Everything was peaceful and calm and there was almost a tangible sense 
of relief.”261 
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Not only the public – a broad spectrum of the population, including former cabinet 
members in civilian governments, were convinced that the country had been saved from the 
brink of self-destruction.262 Majority of Turkish press was on the side of the coup. 
Interestingly, there was no armed resistance to the intervention: terrorist organizations 
seemed to have vanished into thin air. In the first day, the takeover was a simple, 
straightforward operation with no loss of life (it had a “clinical” nature) – indeed, Ecevit’s 
metaphor of a football match turned out to be a good diagnosis (“the game is finished, 
everybody go home”).263 
 
The coup was well received among the NATO allies who “had become increasingly 
worried about the chaotic political situation in this exposed but vital area of Nato’s 
southeastern flank”.264 The US and European countries reacted overall mildly and they both 
gave green light to the generals’ regime, US giving slightly more unconditional support 
than the European Community. Reagan administration pointed out that the US were always 
concerned when any democratically elected government was ousted by the military, 
however, they reacted with considerable sympathy towards the coup. The immediate 
reaction of Brussels after the coup was that the coup would inevitably stifle discussion on 
Turkey’s wish to become a full member of the EEC. However, they also stated that there 
will be no automatic freezing of relations between the European Community and Turkey.265 
The communiqué released by the European Community Council of Ministers (15 
September) stated that they knew that the Turkish army is not a Latin American army and 
that the civilian rule would be restored in good time, but it also induced the generals to 
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provide a time-table of their transition to democracy, and it said that there should be no 
political arrests or trials and that human rights should be respected.266 
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PART II 
THE MILITARY JUTA 1980-1983 
 
 
 
 
   “I just saw: Three people were dragging a man. The man didn’t want to go with 
them. At one point he managed to free himself from their hands and throw himself to 
the moat alonside the road. Just then a sound came. Somebody shouted. More 
precisely, somebody screamed. /.../ The people dragging the man (they had jumped 
into to the moat and tossed the man to the road in a split second) stopped for a 
moment and listened to the environment. It means that they also heard the scream. 
But as if they hadn’t given it much importance, they started dragging the man 
again.” 
 
Ferit Edgü: Scream (1982) 
 
The Second Part talks about the actions and reforms that the military government 
undertook during its three years and three months in power: from their initial uncertainty as 
to what would be the nature of the necessary systemic changes, to the legislative and 
institutional framework they finally introduced. The focus is on the 1982 constitution and 
its reception, the new Party and Electoral laws, and the 1983 elections that concluded the 
military rule (chapters 7. to 11.); the last chapter is an attempt of a theoretical-speculative 
evaluation of the military’s role in the early 1980s. 
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7. First Steps Towards Political Reorganization 
 
 
 
After having wiped out the existing political establishment, the military commanders found 
themselves faced with a task of forming a new government. They were in a dilemma 
whether the government should be comprised of civilians or military people.267 
  
Evren’s preference for the position of the new prime minister was Turhan Feyzioğlu, a 
former professor of political science who opposed Ecevit’s “left-of-centre” slogan of 1966 
and left RPP with his sympathizers to establish the Republican Reliance Party (RRP). The 
party was noted for its centrism, for its old-styled RPP politics and economic policies 
favoring bureaucratic planning and mixed economy. However, naming of Feyzioğlu met 
with opposition. 
 
Within the military some people saw him as a representative of the old generation 
politicians raised in the spirit of mixed economy that was going to be abandoned. Feyzioğlu 
himself was glad about the proposal and said that the new cabinet should include 
representatives of all major political groupings, especially the moderate tendencies in both 
RPP and JP. But the representatives from the RPP and JP whom the military invited 
refused the offers, arguing against Feyzioğlu (Orhan Eyüboğlu of the RPP commented that 
Feyzioğlu was a “leader of a tiny party with almost no support in Turkish public 
opinion”).268 The invited party functionaries still listened to their party chiefs in custody, 
waited for their permissions and followed their instructions, to a big displeasure and 
irritation of the General Staff. It seemed as if the politicians now saw military interventions 
as a normal ten-yearly cycle in Turkish politics, an occasional “spring cleaning”. They 
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thought the army would withdraw soon. If they collaborated with the military this would 
not be perceived favorably by the public and their future political career could be 
jeopardized.269 
 
The General Staff lost their nerves and abolished their plan to form a civilian cabinet. They 
decided that the prime minister of the military government should be a civilian with 
military origins. On 18 September they appointed admiral Bülent Ulusu as the new prime 
minister (he had been just retired in August prior to the coup). Appointment of retired 
military personnel to key positions would become a trend during this junta.270 Other 
members of the new cabinet swore on the same day in the Grand National Assembly: 
general Kenan Evren; general Nurettin Ersin; general Tahsin Şahinkaya; admiral Nejat 
Tümer (he had been promoted to this position in August 1980 after the retirement of Bülent 
Ulusu); and general Sedat Celasun, commander of the gendarmerie. All five of them were 
actually members of the NSC.271 We should also mention the general secretary of the NSC, 
Haydar Saltık, as one who played an important role in the post-coup military 
government.272 
 
The new government set up six Specialist Commissions comprised of 20-25 experts. There 
were no active or former politicians in them, only bureaucrats or retired officers.273 The 
commissions serviced the General Staff and the NSC. General Haydar Saltık, who had been 
one of the engineers of the coup, was in charge of them. Their function was to advise the 
NSC, to suggest amendments to existing laws and propose new legislation. However, in the 
run up to the November 1983 elections the NSC remained the principal locus of decision 
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making.274 The NSC also acted through the regional and local commanders, who were 
given wide-ranging powers under martial law and were in charge of education, press, 
chambers of commerce and trade unions (and did not hesitate to use their powers).275 
 
As for the policies of the junta regarding governance and society, the military basically 
wanted to make sure that a crisis and political turmoil seen in the 1970s would never 
happen again. They had to reform the system, yet in the start they did not know exactly 
how to do it. They were only sure that they should proceed along the path of Ataturkism, 
but this was problematic in itself: the military had its own down-to-earth definitions of 
Ataturkism or Kemalism, while in the civilian world there were as many definitions as the 
number of intellectuals dealing with the subject. They started off, for instance, by making 
Ataturkism a compulsory subject in all places of education (children had to memorize 
Atatürk’s speech to the Grand National Assembly giving an account of the War of 
Independence and the basic principle of the new republic).276 
 
They also knew that they had to considerably reform the political structure and to replace 
the existing political establishment with a new generation of politicians, having in mind 
that a more militarily disciplined society should be formed. So during the three years and 
two months of the junta, commanders, with the assistance of commissions, made a number 
of political and institutional reforms. We will take a closer look at some of the political 
reforms, but before that, we will go over some of the concrete measures of the military: 
how they dealt with the terror problem, media, universities and trade unions (ataturkisation 
in social sense is already largely dealt with in chapters 5.3. and 5.4.). 
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7.1. Military Junta in Action 
 
 
One issue that had been unanimously acknowledged within the military elite as an urgent 
problem was coping with terror. It was swiftly coped with immediately after the takeover. 
A wave of arrests swept the country. In the first six weeks after 12 September 11,500 
people were arrested; by the end of 1980 the number grew to 30,000 and after one year 
122,600 arrests were made. By September 1982, two years after the coup, 80,000 were still 
in prison, 30,000 of them awaiting trial. The number of terrorist incidents decreased by 
over 90%.277 In concrete figures, it fell to 282 during the first twelve months after the coup. 
During the same period, 734,000 weapons together with 3 million rounds of ammunition 
were captured or handed in. The scourge of political violence was virtually ended by 
1982.278 
 
Although restoration of law and order was fast and efficient, it had its dark side as well. As 
in 1971-73, there were numerous reports of the use of tortures to extract confessions from 
suspects. When complaints were made, most of these cases were denied.279 Torture was 
endemic primarily during the period during which people can be held in custody before 
charges are brought. During the junta, this period was 90 day, but it was brought down 
during the 1980s and 1990s, also thanks to the international human rights organization 
Amnesty International that was repeatedly drawing attention to the widespread use of 
torture.280 
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The trials were sped up under the enhanced martial law. Over the two years of the military 
junta nearly 3,600 death sentences were pronounced, though only 20 were actually carried 
out. There were also tens of thousands of lesser sentences.281 
 
Universities were put under tight centralized control through the Higher Education Council 
(Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu), established under the Higher Education Law, which directly 
appointed all rectors and deans. In the late 1982, more than 300 academics were dismissed, 
followed by a second wave of dismissals early in 1983. Those fired also lost their pensions 
and the right ever again to hold a job in the public sector.282 In many cases, the 
commanders of the martial law broadened their campaign to include those academics who 
merely expressed radical or critical views, without actively engaging in political violence. 
The Higher Education Laws therefore practically ended the independence of universities 
from the government.283 
 
Trade unions, an important political actor in the 1970s, were not spared either. DĐSK, the 
radical left-wing labor confederation was dissolved immediately after the coup, and all the 
members of its executive were put on trial in December 1981. The trial lasted for five years 
and ended in December 1986, with long prison sentences, but the accused were then 
provisionally released.284 
 
The restrictions on media were severe. There were continuous series of closures of 
newspapers and arrests of journalists and editors, especially in Istanbul which was the 
center of intellectual life and of the press.285 
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8. Abolishment of Political Parties and Bans Regarding Politicians 
 
 
 
General Evren made it clear that there was no place for former politicians in the future of 
Turkey. Demirel and Ecevit were released from their detention in October 1980. Erbakan 
and Türkeş were brought to trial (charged of planning to change the constitutional order of 
the country), but in both cases a verdict non guilty was brought. Immediately after the 
coup, the old parties were suspended. However, in October 1981 the parties were officially 
dissolved and their possessions were confiscated (so they were not only banned – they were 
abolished). The archives of the parties, including the RPP archives of the last 30 years 
disappeared and they were probably destroyed.286 
 
In June 1981 all public discussion of political matters was prohibited, and in 1982 the NSC 
forbade the old politicians to make any statements “about the past or future political or 
legal system of Turkey”.287 Demirel remained in his home in Ankara and waited for a 
chance for a political come-back. Privately, he was clear about his opposition to the 
generals and their works. Ecevit, however, returned to his former profession of journalism. 
In December 1980 he began editing a weekly magazine (called Arayış – “Search”) for 
which he regularly wrote articles critical of the military regime. The 1981 decree of the 
NSC forbidding public political discussion was in fact a reaction to this kind of criticisms. 
Under this decree, Ecevit was removed from his editorship and was sentenced to four 
months imprisonment. Furthermore, after his release, he was arrested twice during 1982 for 
his statements to various foreign media.288 
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9. The 1982 Constitution 
 
 
 
Enacting a new constitution was one of the conditions set by the military junta before the 
regime could be handed over to a civilian government. The process in which the new 
constitution was brought about began in October 1981, when a Consultative Assembly was 
convened. The Consultative Assembly and the NSC together made up a Constituent 
Assembly, responsible for preparing the constitution. We already know the composition of 
the NSC; more interesting is the story of the Consultative Assembly. In legal terms, the 
Consultative Assembly shared legislative powers with the NSC, but in practice the final say 
rested with Evren and hid colleagues of the NSC. It had 160 members who were appointed 
by the NSC, 40 of them directly and 120 after nomination by the new governors, who had 
been themselves appointed by the military. 289 The Consultative Assembly elected a fifteen-
member committee, headed by Orhan Aldıkaçtı, professor at Faculty of Law at Istanbul 
University. 290 The main work of preparing the constitutional text was given to this 
committee. It presented its first draft of the constitution in July 1982. The draft was then 
amended by the Consultative Assembly and finally by the NSC, which added a number of 
crucial Provisional Articles. The full text was submitted to a referendum on 7 November 
1982. 291 On the same day, electors were voting both for the new constitution and for the 
presidential candidate Kenan Evren. Moreover, the two different electoral questions were 
not only held on the same day, but were coupled and brought under the same question: a 
‘yes’ vote for the constitution meant at the same time a ‘yes’ vote for the presidential 
candidate.292 In the referendum, the constitution was accepted by a 91.4% majority and the 
turn out was a high 91.3%.293 
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The process by which the constitution was introduced received a lot of criticisms. One was 
that the election of the president and approval of the constitution should have been put to 
the voters as two separate questions. Another criticism regarded the fact that no candidate 
was allowed to run against Evren (under the Provisional Article 1).294 Further, public 
discussion of the crucial provisional articles was officially banned, in fact, any criticisms of 
the constitution and criticisms of the speeches that Kenan Evren made in favor of a ‘yes’ 
vote were banned by a decree on 20 October 1982.295 Abstainers from elections were to 
lose their voting right for the following five years and had to pay a fine.296 
 
The constitution itself concentrated power in the hands of the executive and increased the 
powers of the president and the National Security Council. It also limited the freedom of 
trade unions: for instance, it banned political strikes, solidarity strikes and national 
strikes.297  
 
Rights and liberties of the individual were curtailed: rights such as freedom of speech and 
freedom of association, although included in the constitution, could be annulled, suspended 
or limited on the grounds of a whole series of considerations, including the national 
interest, public order, national security, danger to the republican order and public health.298 
Further, the Senate, which was generally agreed to have been an unnecessary encumbrance, 
was abolished. Turkey now had a unicameral parliament with a reduced membership of 400 
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(by contrast to the earlier over 600) and an increased term of five years (compared to the 
earlier four years).299 
 
The new constitution gave the president the right to call early general elections if the 
government lost a vote of confidence – this avoided the previous problematic situations in 
which the assembly frequently voted a government out of office but could not then agree to 
vote for early elections. The president would be elected for a seven-year term and could not 
be reelected. The increased power given to the president also implied the right to appoint 
all the members of the Constitutional Court and members of the other important judicial 
bodies. The president had the power to return draft legislation to the assembly if he desired, 
however, he had no absolute right of veto (if the assembly readopted the draft without 
change then he was obliged to promulgate it as law). Thus, all in all, the 1982 constitution 
created a parliamentary rather then presidential republic.300 
 
Increased authority was also given to the National Security Council. The number of 
civilians and the military personnel was to remain as it was under the 1961 constitution. 
However, the government was now obliged to give “priority consideration” to its decisions. 
Some have commented that this created an executive that weighted towards the military 
rather than being responsible to the Grand National Assembly. Among the critics, Bülent 
Ecevit noted that they merely established “an army regime in mufti” (army regime in 
civilian clothes) and not a real democracy.301 
 
 
 
10. ew Party and Electoral Laws 
 
 
 
The Political Parties Law was passed after the introduction of the new constitution (on 3 
June 1983). It was aimed at exerting control over who would enter political scene of the 
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reformed Turkey. The new parties were to be subjected to a mass of bureaucratic 
restrictions. To be legally established they had to have at least thirty founder members. 
They had to submit to the Ministry of Interior a formal statement including the names and 
personal details of the members. A provisional section of the Political Parties Law allowed 
the NSC to veto founder members at it discretion, thus enabling it to deprive parties of 
sufficient founders and disabling the party to register in the coming elections.302 
 
More restrictions were made as to the allowed membership in the parties. Students, 
teachers and civil servants were banned from party membership. The new parties were not 
allowed to form roots in society because they were not allowed to have women’s or youth 
branches, or to develop links with the trade unions and to open branches in villages. All in 
all, in the run up to the 1983 elections, some 15 parties were founded, but the military 
deemed 12 of them unacceptable, even after several changes were made to the list of 
founders.303 
 
The new law required the parties to win at least 10% of the national vote to qualify for any 
parliamentary seats. Hence it made it very difficult for fringe parties to reduce parliament 
to a state of chaos, or for smaller parties to exert exorbitant influence on large parties as 
would frequently happen during the 1970s (and was interpreted by the lawmakers as one of 
the reasons for a breakdown of the system). It made it much more likely for a stable 
majority government to be formed.304 
 
 
 
11. End of the Junta: Elections of 6 ovember 1983 
 
 
 
The first elections after the military junta were not yet perfectly free elections, mainly 
because of the fact that the military exerted a considerable control as to what parties were 
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allowed to compete in the elections. As mentioned earlier, most of the new parties that 
applied to register had their members vetoed so they could not even be established. In the 
end, three parties were allowed to take part in the elections of 6 November 1983: 
 
- Party of Nationalist Democracy (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi; PND), led by retired 
general Turgut Sunalp. 
- Populist Party (Halkçı Partisi; PP), led by Necdet Calp. 
- Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi; MP), led by Turgut Özal. 
 
The military leadership came out in support of the PND.305 Yet their plan was to let a 
moderate leftist party run against the PND to give legitimacy to the elections. That is why 
they also supported the PP – a party closest to the traditional Kemalist wing of the RPP – 
although to a lesser extent then the PND. The party leader Necdet Calp, a senior civil 
servant, had links with the former RPP and had served as private secretary to Đsmet Đnönü. 
He was afraid that his party would be opposed by former members of the RPP. This came 
true, but the opposition did not from Ecevit but from the middle-ranking politicians of the 
former RPP, who established the Social Democracy Party (SDP) in June 1983. Its leader, 
Erdal Đnönü, was the son of Đsmet Đnönü. In general, the SDP adopted the policies of the 
former RPP, though Đnönü publicly accepted the legitimacy of the 12 September coup. The 
junta, faced with the new situation had to decide whether to abandon Calp and support the 
SDP, or to exclude the SDP from the elections. In the end, the NSC vetoed 21 out of 26 
founder members of the SDP, including Erdal Đnönü.306 Same thing happened with parties 
behind which Demirel stood as their engineer, since he was not officially allowed to 
participate (the Great Turkey Party and the True Path Party, announced in May and June 
1983, respectively, were vetoed). Same treatment awaited the Conservative Party, set up by 
supporters of Alparslan Türkeş, and the Welfare Party, a similar proxy organization for 
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Necmettin Erbakan.307 Turgut Özal resigned from the cabinet in 1982 after a financial 
affair.308 In his own account, in the run up towards the elections he was urged by people to 
set up his own party. The NSC was not against it – reportedly, the military did not expect 
his party to win many votes – so the Motherland party was officially established in May 
1983.309 
 
After having reduced the competing parties to three, the junta then made other moves to 
keep the election campaign within the desired frame. In September 1983 the NSC issued 
individual vetoes on 719 parliamentary candidates, of whom 475 were independents, 89 
members of the PP, 81 of the MP and 74 of the PND. Any criticism of the NSC’s decisions 
was banned in the election campaign, and those parties which had been prevented from 
entering the elections were forbidden to make statements which might influence the 
result.310 
 
In the elections the MP won an overwhelming victory – it got over 45%, while the PP 
scored 30%, and the PND, the generals’ party, scored slightly over 23%. It turned out that 
Turgut Özal, the man behind the economic reform program launched in 1979-80 and who 
was in charge of the economy under the military regime until he resigned for financial 
scandals, was perceived as the least close to the military, thus attracted the vote of those 
who were eager to see the military out of politics after three years.311 Moreover, for the first 
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time television played a major role in the campaign. Sunalp’s performance on television 
was seen as stiff and uncomfortable; apart from this, his party did not have much to offer to 
the electorate, other than preventing a resurgence of terrorism (which had largely been 
taken care of by the military already). On the other hand, Özal was a skilled TV performer, 
and he demonstrated his competence in economic questions which were probably the main 
focus of concerns for the voters.312 
 
As the new electoral system was in favor of large parties, the MP got an absolute majority 
in the new assembly.313 The new assembly was convened on 24 November and Özal, with 
his cabinet, was installed as the new prime minister on 12 December. Meanwhile, the 
military used its final weeks of power to issue a decree banning any criticism of any of its 
pronouncements since 12 September 1980.314 Thereafter, they continued having a close 
watch on politics through president Evren and through the NSC.315 
 
 
 
12. Military Coup in Retrospective: Who’s the Real Son of Atatürk? 
 
 
 
Somewhere in Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant notes his – as controversial as much 
as famous – statement that “one ought to understand a writer (author) better than he 
understood himself”.316 Soon after the Critique became a “bestseller” and the intellectual 
elite of Prussia started rigorously studying the text, the readers found themselves in 
difficulty as they were coming across certain unclear and insufficiently explicated places, 
even contradictions within the text. Thereby emerged a dilemma as to how exactly the text 
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should be approached: should we read it according to the letter or should we read it 
according to the spirit? Concretely, representatives of the first camp were convinced that 
Kant’s metaphysical system laid down in the Critique does not contain contradictions, and 
those who are finding them did not understand the system properly. Representatives of the 
second camp, on the other hand, insisted that Kant’s system was inconsistent.317 Their 
assessment was that Kant posed the right questions and defined the right goals (i.e. to 
ground our knowledge on solid foundations and rescue science from the spreading 
skepticist critique), but did not answer them well. Thus they wanted to “rewrite the 
Critique”, to formulate a new display that would pursue the same goal, but would at the 
same time take into consideration all the objections posed to Kant’s Critique.318 
 
The way how their idea of this project was defined represented the first minimal step away 
from Kant, yet a step that paved the way for the entire post-Kantian idealist philosophy. 
The project found its first materialization in the writings of Karl Leonhard Reinhold, one of 
Kant’s most eminent critics. To put it very briefly and schematically: Reinhold’s own 
system, called “fundamental philosophy”, was also imperfect and it broke due to numerous 
critiques. Johann Gottlieb Fichte took the critiques seriously and composed Reinhold’s 
system anew by acknowledging the critiques. His text Foundations of the Entire Science of 
Knowledge, by this time, represented a considerable dissociation from Kant: for instance, 
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dogmatism by all means (in fact, the aim of his Critique was to found knowledge 
undogmatically).  
318 Hence the demands regarding the new display were, first, that knowledge should be 
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something like axiomatic systems in mathematics). 
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Fichte decided to abolish the Ding an Sich (thing-in-itself), one of the central concepts of 
Kant’s system.319 
 
Interestingly, Kant himself was asked who of all those who claimed to be his followers 
understood him best. Kant wrote his answer half year later in an article where, surprisingly 
enough, he denounced and sharply attacked Fichte. As the most adequate interpret he 
named Gottlob Ernst Shulze – an author who was basically just repeating what Kant had 
said.320 
 
What all the prominent post-Kantian philosophers (Reinhold, Fichte, also Hegel later on) 
did was simply to take seriously Kant’s own motto: they tried to understand Kant better 
then he understood himself – they applied this motto to their predecessors’ theories, 
                                                 
319 Kant’s theory of perception claimed that every object that we experience has two 
components: on one hand, it carries its own objective attributes; on the other hand, it 
bares the structure that the subject’s mind puts onto the object (Kant calls this structure 
the a priori form; time and space are a priori forms – there is no object that is not 
perceived in time and space). Thus every perception is affected from two sides: from 
the object and from the subject. An object that is not affected by subject’s a priori 
forms is called the thing-in-itself. Thing-in-itself cannot be perceived, it is 
unintelligible: we do know how it looks or feels, we only know it does not exist in time 
and space. A perception occurs when the thing-in-itself affects the subject and is 
processed by the a priori forms. Fichte found the concept of the thing-in-itself 
redundant and absurd: if we cannot know anything about the thing-in-itself, we cannot 
even know that it exists. It is a transcendent notion, therefore a mere assumption. 
Moreover, mind cannot be affected by an external thing-in-itself but only by its own 
ideas (because of specific rules of causality that Kant himself postulated, but according 
to Fichte he did not follow them consistently enough). By contrast, Fichte claimed that 
the subject is the cause of objects (an idea which he elaborated comprehensively in the 
above-mentioned text). 
We should also note that a further step from Fichte – and the last one in the arch of 
German idealism – occurred with Hegel: his entire Phenomenology of Spirit can be 
read as a critique and improvement of Fichte’s Foundations of the Entire Science of 
Knowledge. 
320 There are speculations that Kant simply wanted to distance himself from Fichte 
because a connection with him was politically risky. Fichte had written an essay in 
which he argued for atheism, in a time not long after the French Revolution where the 
king had been beheaded. That is why atheism had very real consequences and was 
condemned by other emperors. 
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theories they were faced with. Now we can understand what the motto actually means: it 
simply means that you have only fully understood the author once you have not only 
studied him in depth and to the full extent, but also realized where he failed. When you 
read the author, you need not only read what he explicitly says, but also try and catch him 
in his contradictions. Therein, to truly understand the author is to resolve these 
contradictions, to bridge the gaps in his theory that the author himself did not realize or was 
not able to bridge – an operation that ultimately leads to advancement of the theory, 
possibly even to a new theoretical system. 
 
This explains why the prime philosophical systems of German idealism following Kant –
Fichte and Hegel, to an extent also Reinhardt – were on the one hand so profoundly 
different and in contrast to Kant’s system both in content and style (also between each 
other), yet on the other hand all of these philosophers were essentially claiming that they 
were after the same thing: to found “the Absolute Knowledge”, or “the absolute ground of 
all knowledge”. Paradoxically, those who ultimately failed in understanding Kant and were 
remembered as a dead end in the arc of German idealism were those who stuck to his 
system literally and plainly reproduced it, by adding a few interpretative tools here and 
there (similarly as theologists comment on the holy texts of saints, if we are allowed to 
make this comparison). 
 
Another example of the same phenomenon – this one being less theoretical and more 
pertinent to real life and politics – can be traced in Karl Marx’s essay on Louis Bonaparte, a 
less famous nephew of the famous Napoléon Bonaparte. In the essay Marx analyzes actual 
historical events in post-Napoleonic France that led up to Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état on 
2 December 1851. In the introduction, he gives his often quoted statement: 
 
   “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world-historical facts and personages 
occur, as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second 
time as farce. Caussidière for Danton, Lous Blanc for Robespierre, the Mountain of 
1848 to 1851 for the Mountain of 1793 to 1795, the Nephew for the Uncle.”321 
                                                 
321 Chapter on Karl Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in The Marx-
Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 594. 
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The word “tragedy” should be understood as “drama”, as something of a great historical 
value and range; Marx attributes it to the role of “the Uncle”, Napoléon Bonaparte 
(Napoléon I), who spread the French revolutionary ideals to almost entire Europe during 
the era of Napoleonic wars (1803-1815). On the other hand, he does not spare attacks and 
mockery for “the Nephew”, Louis Bonaparte. 
 
In many aspects, political careers of Napoleon Bonaparte and Louis Bonaparte were much 
alike: they both rose high in the political sphere in a democratic way during republican 
periods, then seized the entire executive by means of coup d’état, proclaimed a monarchy 
and announced themselves as emperors of the monarchy. Louis Bonaparte came to power 
during the French Second Republic (1848-52) by a popular vote – a remarkable 75% of the 
total vote. Much of the upper class supported him as a man who would restore order and 
end the instability in France following the overthrow of the monarchy earlier in the 1848. 
During the first few years in office he governed cautiously, pleasing the conservative 
assembly and trying to gain support from the religious right by allowing for a greater role 
of the Church in the educational system. As the constitution did not allow the possibility of 
re-election for the president, in the third year of his four-year mandate, his request to 
amend the constitution was rejected by the parliament. 
 
At the time, there were several restrictions on universal male suffrage, preventing a large 
portion of the lower class from voting. Bonaparte surrounded himself with lieutenants loyal 
to him, secured the support of the army, and started touring the country, making speeches 
critical of the assembly and presenting himself as the protector of universal male suffrage. 
After a few months, he staged a coup d’état, seized the power and proclaimed himself 
Emperor of France on 2 December 1851 – the 47th anniversary of Napoléon I’s crowning as 
emperor.322 For about a decade, Bonaparte’s regime had apparent authoritarian 
                                                 
322 Cf. entry “Napoleon III” in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon_III) 
[accessed on 14 April 2011]. 
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characteristics, using press censorship to suppress the opposition, manipulating elections, 
and depriving the parliament of the right to free debate or any real power. 323 
 
Crucial in Marx’s interpretation of Bonaparte’s regime is the notion of Bonaparte’s self-
perception as the true representative of the masses (of the “middle” and the “lower class” in 
Marx’s terms, i.e. the most populous portion of society) and as the embodiment of the 
national will – a mentality that Marx appraises as mere Bonaparte’s tool for clinging on to 
power while practicing authoritarian rule over the very same population that it clams to 
truly represent: 
 
   “As the executive authority which has made itself an independent power, 
Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard “civil order”. But the strength of 
this civil order lies in the middle class. He looks on himself, therefore, as the 
representative of the middle class and issue decrees in this sense. Nevertheless, he is 
somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of this middle 
class and daily breaks it anew. … At the same time, Bonaparte looks on himself as 
the representative of the peasants, and of the people in general, against the 
bourgeoisie… Bonaparte would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all 
classes.”324 
 
Marx makes many other comments on Louis Bonaparte’s rhetorical style and mode of 
governing: the general impression is that his style “forms a highly comical contrast to the 
imperious, categorical style of the government decrees, a style which is faithfully copied 
from the uncle”.325 
 
Now, to bring the account of Bonaparte’s self-perception into comparison with the Turkish 
military’s role in 1980, let us take Kenan Evren’s television and radio broadcast in the 
dawn of 12 September 1980: 
 
   “The aim of this operation is to protect the integrity of the country, to secure 
national unity and fellowship, to prevent an impending civil war … I call upon all 
                                                 
323 Ibid. 
324 The Marx-Engels Reader , pp. 614-616 (all the words in italics marked by M.T.). 
325 Ibid., p. 615 (words in italics marked by M.T.). 
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citizens to remain calmly by the side of their radios and televisions and to follow the 
decrees which will be broadcasted, to obey these, and to trust the Turkish armed 
forces which have sprung from the bosom of the nation.” 326 
 
A similar idea about the military’s mission and its deep-rootedness in the national body is 
expressed in Evren’s speech on the celebration of the Victory day, 30 August 1980, prior to 
the coup: 
 
   “The traitors who are the instigators of anarchy, of the chaos through which they 
seek to eradicate the democratic order and the unity of our state, will soon get their 
just deserts. As in the case of some others encountered in our history who dared to 
raise their ugly heads, they will be crushed under the fist of the Turkish armed forces 
raised in judgment … and the exalted Turkish nation will celebrate Victory Day 
forever in affluence an happiness within the security created by the armed forces 
which lie at the bosom of our great nation.327 
 
The analogy seems to be almost perfect: Louis Bonaparte and the TGS were both deeply 
inspired by their predecessors – either actual (Napoléon I) or symbolic (Atatürk); they were 
also both notorious for their self-perception as the representative of the nation in its essence 
and embodiment of its true will, while in fact implementing an authoritarian regime.328 
 
                                                 
326 Birand, The Generals’ Coup in Turkey, p. 187 (words in italics marked by M.T.). 
327 Ibid., p. 166 (words in italics marked by M.T.). 
328 The Turkish military in the 1980 coup therefore seems to have played an 
emphatically bonapartist role. However, we have to be aware of one important 
distinction: while Louis Bonaparte kept playing off one class against another, 
proclaiming at one time to be one the side of the bourgeoisie, and at another to protect 
the peasants from the bourgeoisie (which is why Marx describes his rule as a 
“contradictory and confused groping”), the Turkish military did not play off one class 
against another, nor did it search for support among any of the particular sections of 
society – their source of legitimacy was far more general and abstract (“the-Turkish-
Nation-with-its-political-fiat-materialized-in-the-principles-of-Atatürk”), and in that 
sense more sophisticated. 
It is also important to note here that Louis Bonaparte’s rise and rule have been seen as a 
forerunner of the phenomenon that was to become known in the twentieth century as 
fascism (Marx’s interpretation in the respective essay is therefore of interest as a sort of 
prologue to later Marxist thought on the nature and meaning of fascism). (Cf. The 
Marx-Engels Reader, p. 594.) 
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Bonaparte’s intention to reach the height and glory of his uncle, and the style that he was 
consequently literally copying from the uncle turned out to be in a harsh contrast with the 
actual achievements during his reign.329 Precisely this contrast between the intention and 
positive self-perception on one hand, and the actual mediocrity and unoriginality on the 
other is the reason why Marx labels Bonaparte as a farce. 
 
Coming back to the Turkish military, in some of the accounts of the 1980-83 military 
regime that are slightly leaning in favor of it, the positive role of Kenan Evren is especially 
emphasized. Kemal K. Karpat in his article attributes the following virtues to Evren: 
 
   “[Evren] attempted to speak on behalf of the nation as a whole, without attacking 
by name the old leaders or the political parties but merely condemning the 
politicians’ ineptitude and their disregard for the national interest. He was also able to 
convey to the public his feelings of trust, respect, and consideration for them by 
keeping them informed about the important developments concerning the nation as a 
whole … In sum, Evren’s reserved and dignified manners, his carrying attitude 
toward the public, his ability to rise above political parties and individual concerns in 
the name of the nation cast him in the image of a charismatic father figure. … the few 
army commanders in whose hands the power was concentrated with no 
intermediaries between them and the populace, were seen as incorruptible and 
dedicated to the national good.”330 
 
A few paragraphs later Karpat notes: 
 
   “… there is a close resemblance between the methods used by Evren and Atatürk in 
dealing with the public. The dominant philosophy in both areas was that 
governmental authority should be exercised strictly in conformity with the political 
requirements of rulership, eschewing social, economic, or ideological 
considerations.”331 
 
                                                 
329 His decade in power lacks the favorable historical reputation that Napoléon I enjoys. 
For instance, Victor Hugo portrayed Louis Bonaparte as “Napoléon the Small”, a mere 
mediocrity, in contrast with “Napoléon the Great”, a military and administrative genius. 
Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon_III#Legacy [accessed on 13.04.2011]. 
330 Karpat, “Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and 
After 1980”, p. 150. 
331 Ibid., p. 152. 
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We should complement this statement: not only there is a close resemblance between the 
political methods and main principles of Atatürk and Evren – the relation between the two 
is virtually a complete formal identity. Evren and the military in 1980 did almost exactly 
what Atatürk’s principles, the corpus of the six arrows dictate: they suppressed the non-
secular, Islamist tendencies, separatist movements, non-nationalist (internationalist) 
organizations, took control over the education and put emphasis on the youth and the 
youth’s internalization of Kemalist ideals etc.  
 
Although, to be fair, not all of the Kemalist principles were left unmodified, particularly 
those regarding economic matters. The Kemalist model of a mixed economy, encouraging 
the state to intervene and orientate economic life, apparently contradicted the model of 
liberal economy which reduced the role of state to minimum, yet it was set as a priority in 
the agenda of the new military regime. Does this mean that the military carried out re-
thinking of the basic doctrine? It does not seem so: when average cadets in military 
academies are asked about the Atatürk’s principles, they name étatism along with other 
principles and grant it an equal place among them; considering, on the other hand, that the 
actual economic model is no longer étatist and that they are also aware of it, this issue 
remains obscure and unclear in their minds, since no study has been undertaken in order to 
resolve the contradiction and find some sort of synthesis.332 
 
Indeed, the tedious, mainly intellectual work of re-questioning and re-evaluating the 
original set of Kemalist principles has not been carried out in the military Moreover, 
especially from the mid-1970s onwards these principles have become particularly fixed and 
rigid. Having said that, can we really claim that Evren was a charismatic father figure, like 
the one of Atatürk? Was he not rather a farce of Atatürk, an “anti-Atatürk” par 
excellence?333 If Evren did resemble Atatürk, and had a strong identification with him, his 
                                                 
332 Cf. Birand, Shirts of Steel, p. 67. 
333 We can go even further in this fashion, adding insult to injury, and supplement the 
original Marx’s statement: “All great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it 
were, twice: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. Caussidière for Danton, 
Louis Blanc for Robespierre, the Mountain of 1848 to 1851 for the Mountain of 1793 
to 1795, the Nephew for the Uncle, and Kenan Evren for Mustafa Kemal.” 
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identification was identification through copying instead of identification through 
overcoming. 
 
Therefore, somewhat paradoxically, a real identification and continuation can be realized 
only through a process of antagonism and disruptions; in the context of ideas and 
ideologies: to be faithful to an ideology means to exceed it through the medium of radical 
criticism or at times even through disavowal and rejection of it, instead of simply 
reproducing it – only once you have made that fundamental step you may claim that your 
system of principles holds a true legacy over the original system. 
 
The problem of the Turkish military of 1980 and post-1980 was that they never “killed the 
father” – we hereby refer to Freud’s notion of patricide, or better, symbolic patricide, which 
teaches that a boy’s final identification with his father (i.e. incorporation of his personality 
characteristics in a resolved Oedipus complex) is only a result of prior antagonism towards 
the father, and a subconscious wish to kill the father.334 Kenan Evren and company naively 
betrayed the legacy of Atatürk precisely by sticking to it too rigidly, by “reading it 
according to the letter” and identifying with it superficially – they had done nothing to 
develop and exceed Atatürk and his philosophy (the fact that during their training the 
soldiers are encouraged to feel an almost physical presence of Atatürk should be taken 
seriously in this context). It is therefore difficult to say who held the real legacy of Atatürk 
– recall the remark by M. A. Birand that there were as many definitions of Kemalism 
before the coup as was the number of intellectuals dealing with the subject – yet we can 
surely claim that it was not the military. In fact, by degrading its doctrine to the level of 
mere epigonism, the military was probably the least Kemalist actor on the political scene of 
the time. 
 
                                                 
334 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (New York : Modern Library, 1994), 
p. 155. 
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COCLUSIO 
 
 
 
 
The 1980 military coup took place in a country deeply disturbed by inner conflicts and 
institutional crisis that had been growing for several years. The factors leading to the crisis 
were roughly four-fold: malfunctioning of parliamentary democracy, political terrorism, 
economic crisis and changes in the international political context. Second half of the 1970s 
saw one fragile coalition government and two weak minority governments. Partisanship in 
the civil bureaucracy drastically increased and the governments were not able to detain 
street terror and cope with economic problems. The frequent changes of weak governments 
went along with inconclusive elections and months of country being run by care-taking 
governments, continuous disproving of the rules of parliamentary procedures, and 
parliamentary deadlocks (for example, fruitless voting for new president in 1980). 
Meanwhile, another type of conflict was taking place in the streets of Turkish cities and 
university campuses: clashes between civilians, mostly youth and students that were 
directly or indirectly linked to smaller and extreme political parties, or belonging to 
different ethnic groups, took form of an armed conflict. Number of death casualties 
mounted to an average of 20 per day by 1979; 5,000 people lost their lives from 1976 to 
1980. Martial law was declared in many Turkish provinces. The governments did not 
manage to deal with the economic crisis either. The import-substituting industrialization 
economic model, pursued since the beginning of the 1960s, was a relatively autarkic model 
based on import of intermediate goods and raw materials like oil, while encouraging 
domestic production of industrial goods. With the two oil crises in the 1970s and the rising 
price of oil, cuts of electricity became an everyday reality in Turkey. Inflation was rampant 
and the living standard (real per capita income) did not grow from 1975 onward and 
decreased from 1978 to 1980. Governments tried to solve the crisis with reform packages 
that implied austerity measures, among other things. Austerity measures were resisted by 
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trade unions that were organizing strikes, so the industry became almost paralyzed. A 
further destabilizing political factor was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 which could 
strengthen the Islamic currents in Turkey. At the end of the same year the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan. This event marked the beginning of the “second Cold War”; NATO 
and the US now saw Turkey, already an important NATO ally, as a vital partner in the 
region, a country that was to become the host of military forces which could operate in the 
geostrategically important Middle Eastern region. This, however, could not be realized in 
an unstable Turkey with a considerable opposition against the presence of the NATO in the 
country. 
 
Crisis situation itself was not a sufficient condition for a military takeover as a means of 
resolving the crisis. The takeover took place because of a peculiar world outlook and self-
perception of the Turkish military; moreover, it was precisely the 1980 coup that 
manifested in an exemplary fashion the world outlook and political ideals of the Turkish 
military. The military’s outlook was largely formed in the early phase of the Turkish 
Republic (1930s), in a process that went parallel with another process – elaboration of a 
new narrative of Turkish history, the Turkish History thesis, which placed the origin of 
Turks into central Asia around 4000 years ago and described them as a nation with 
essentially military characteristics. Effectiveness of conscription steeply increased, and the 
military service started to be seen as a moral and patriotic duty of every Turk. The highly 
esteemed and socially central position given to the military institution has also been 
reflected in the self-perception of the military staff. The officers tend to see themselves as 
individuals with better knowledge and qualities than the rest, and the country as something 
that was put in their care and protection against all kinds of threats. They have a particular 
despise for politicians, whom they see as egotistic, untrustworthy, and with an inclination 
to ignore the general interest of the country. These views are basically part of the education 
they receive in the academies, where they learn and introvert the doctrine of Ataturkism, a 
comprehensive set of principles covering different aspects of society, from family life to 
politics. Theoretically speaking, Ataturkism is a variant of corporatist political ideology: it 
is neither socialist nor a truly liberal democratic ideology. In a corporatist society 
individuals take part in occupational groups that provide them both with economic means 
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and offer them a moral and social refuge; the different corporations constitute a harmonious 
economic and social life of the country. Thus, the military’s notion of an ideal society is an 
orderly, harmonious society, with national interests above individual interests and with as 
little inner conflicts as possible. This explains why the military after World War II 
intervened three times: they intervened whenever society became too chaotic and pervaded 
by antagonisms between the government and the opposition, or between different poles of 
the civil society. As Turkey in the late 1970s was probably in the deepest economic and 
social crisis and internal conflict in the post-World War II era, so was the coup and the 
following military regime from 1980 to 1983 heavier. The military leaders decided to 
“rebuild” Turkey by radically changing the rules of political game. They enacted a new 
constitution that concentrated power in the hands of the executive and increased the power 
of the National Security Council. Rights and liberties of the individual, such as freedom of 
speech and freedom of association were included in the constitution, but they could be 
limited or suspended under a series of circumstances. The old parties were dissolved and 
the old politicians were kept out of public life for a while. Prior to the next democratic 
elections that took place in November 1983, the military selected and reduced the parties 
that were allowed to compete in elections to three. Victory of the Motherland Party under 
Turgut Özal came as a surprise, for it was the least favored by the military. From that 
moment on, democracy was restored, however, considering the scope of reforms and 
actions undertook by the junta, some have commented that, especially in the starting phase, 
the new regime was merely a military regime in civilian disguise. 
 
Among the leading tasks of this thesis was to explain a certain paradox immanent to the 
military’s discourse: how is it that the military claims that they are protecting democracy, 
yet they have intervened and suspended democracy three times so far? The answer is that 
they are, in fact, protecting corporatist order, an order that has only sporadic, partial and 
rather coincidental common points with liberalism and parliamentary democracy. The 
democratic ideal is subordinate to superior corporatist goals: that is why the military’s 
notion of democracy is so narrowly defined, and that is why the democratic political life in 
the country can rather easily exceed this tight definition and evoke an intervention. On the 
other hand, the reasons why the military allowed for democracy in the first place, instead of 
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ruling the country according to their political ideals and on their own, were the historical 
and strategic affiliation of Turkey with the western (democratic) regimes, officers’ detest 
for day-to-day conduct of politics, and the fact that the officers’ motives have been more or 
less ideological (protection of Kemalism), that is to say, the military enclave has remained 
relatively uninvolved in seeking economic and other privileges that can come from position 
of power.   
 
To conclude, if we truly want to understand Turkish politics, we need to understand the 
Turkish military, for the ideology the military stands for has had a steadily strong influence 
over Turkish society in general (moreover, this ideology has remained relatively rigid 
through time, a problematic fact that we criticize in the last chapter). For one, the entire set 
of the political elite of the earliest Republican era was socialized in the military and in the 
party established by the military leaders, the RPP (even when the first opposition party 
emerged from the RPP, it was allowed to do so under condition of abiding by the basic 
Kemalist tenets). Further, the military’s influence has been continuous via the institution of 
mandatory military service. And lastly, its influence was reasserted and expanded after 
1980, with a constitution and laws that were enacted under scrutiny of the generals and that 
allowed for a stronger presence of Ataturkism in different institutions, ranging from 
schools and universities to media. 
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